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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the critical risks of improper storage and dis-
posal of hazardous and toxic substances have become frighteningly
apparent,' and the regulation of hazardous waste disposal has be-
1. In December 1984 over 2000 people were killed in Bhopal, India when invisible
methyl isocyanate gas escaped from a Union Carbide underground storage tank. The possi-
bility of the runaway reaction that caused the tank's failure apparently had been reported
to managers of a similar Union Carbide factory in West Virginia. See Union Carbide Had
Been Told of Leak Danger, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 5.
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come increasingly comprehensive and complex, on both the federal
and state level. On the federal level, the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA)2 and the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, or the
Superfund Act)3 together provide a comprehensive statutory and
In 1978 residents of the Love Canal area in New York suffered serious health problems
as a result of chemical waste leaking into their basements from a nearby landfill. Hundreds
of residents were evacuated and relocated at government expense, and the wastes were re-
moved and deposited at another landfill. A recent Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
report found that the new landfill is now leaking, and wastes are migrating off-site, threat-
ening a nearby residential neighborhood. See EPA Draft Report Says Love Canal Wastes
Dumped in Leaking Land Disposal Facility, [Current Developments] 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA)
No. 27, at 1149-50 (Nov. 2, 1984). See generally S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 8-
10 (describing details of Love Canal disaster).
The Tennessee Valley Authority is launching a major program aimed at educating the
public about hazardous waste management. Tennessee produces 19 billion pounds of haz-
ardous waste per year, which ranks the state among the top 10 producers in the nation. The
Tennessean, Jan. 18, 1985, at B2, col. 2.
2. 42 U.S.C §§ 6901-6987 (1982), amended by Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984).
RCRA regulates the treatment, storage, and disposal of "hazardous waste," establishing a
"cradle-to-grave" manifest system designed to keep track of hazardous wastes from their
creation until their permanent disposal and even to monitor them thereafter. See RCRA §§
3001-3007, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6927 (1982). The 1984 RCRA amendments substantially
broaden the scope of the statute and tighten the regulatory restraints. For instance, the
elimination of the small generator exception will subject many more facilities to the regula-
tions. RCRA § 3001(d), 98 Stat. at 3248-49. In addition, the amendments will cover a much
larger field of substances because "hammer" provisions automatically assign a hazardous
rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by a set deadline. RCRA §§ 3004(d), (e),
(f)(3), (g)(6), 98 Stat. at 3227-31. Finally, new enforcement provisions allow more citizen
suits, RCRA § 7003, 98 Stat. at 3271-72, and authorize administrative orders or suits to
compel "corrective action" after a leak has occurred, RCRA § 3008(h), 98 Stat. at 3257-58.
See President Reagan Signs RCRA Amendments; EPA to Adopt Statutory Deadlines as
Rules, [Current Developments] 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 29, at 1243 (Nov. 16, 1984).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982). CERCLA establishes the "Superfund" to finance
cleanup of some sites and requires certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund
or the parties responsible for financing the cleanup. See generally infra notes 180-210 and
accompanying text. CERCLA, which will expire on September 30, 1985, currently provides a
fund of $1.6 billion. The EPA estimates that the cost of cleaning up 1800 dump sites will be
$22.7 billion. See Superfund Law, Clean Water Act, Due to Expire Sept. 30, Emerge as
Top Environmental Priorities for 99th Congress, [Current Developments] 15 ENV'T. REP.
(BNA) No. 37, at 1481 (Jan. 11, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Superfund Law]. The United
States Congress considers CERCLA reauthorization a top priority. Former EPA Adminis-
trator William Ruckleshaus expects reauthorization in some form. Ruckelshaus Says Law
Revisions Depend on Better Relations with Interest Groups, [Current Developments] 15
ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 28, at 1228-29 (Nov. 9, 1984). Several reauthorization bills under
consideration include proposals to increase funding, to increase industry taxes, and to im-
pose a tax on waste disposal. See Sikorski Offers Comprehensive CERCLA Bill; Waste Tax
Bills Introduced in House, Senate, [Current Developments] 15 ENV'T. RaP. (BNA) No. 50,
at 2183 (Apr. 12, 1985).
The EPA notes that CERCLA probably would provide the main statutory response if a
gas leak similar to the leak in Bhopal, India happened in the United States. Even with the
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regulatory scheme designed to cleanup existing hazardous waste
disposal sites and to prevent the growth of future dangerous sites.
4
Other federal statutes address in a more general way the problem
of toxic5 or hazardous substances in the airs and water.7 In addi-
tion, both RCRA and CERCLA allow, encourage, and even de-
mand state participation in establishing and enforcing hazardous
waste regulations on a local level.8 On the state level, regulatory
schemes are similar to the federal laws, 9 or even more stringent.10
1984 Amendments, RCRA still does not cover air emissions from underground tanks. See
Task Force Studies Adequacy of Statutes to Prevent Accidents Similar to Bhopal Case,
[Current Developments] 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 38, at 1508 (Jan. 18, 1985). Congressional
staff members expect that the horror and immediacy of the Bhopal incident will affect Con-
gress' deliberations in reauthorizing CERCLA. See Superfund Law, supra.
4. CERCLA addresses the problem of cleaning up existing dump sites, focusing on the
release of hazardous substances. E.g., CERCLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1982). The Act
broadly defines "release" as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying,
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment."
CERCLA § 1011(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1982). Hazardous substances include substances
designated under other federal environmental statutes, including RCRA, as well as sub-
stances designated under CERCLA as those that "may present substantial danger to the
public health or welfare or the environment." CERCLA §§ 102(a), 101(14), 42 U.S.C. §§
9602(a), 9601(14) (1982). RCRA defines the substances subject to regulation more narrowly
than CERCLA because RCRA applies only to "solid wastes" that qualify as hazardous
under the regulations. RCRA §§ 104(5), 3001, 41 U.S.C. §§ 6903(5), 6921 (1982). The 1984
amendments to RCRA expand its scope by applying automatic deadlines for designating
hazardous substances. See supra note 2.
The RCRA and CERCLA programs may be merging because the EPA intends to apply
RCRA standards to the superfund program. Because a substantial number of sites accepting
superfund wastes violate RCRA standards, the creation of new threats out of old ones en-
dangers the effective functioning of the entire superfund program. See Hedeman Scores
Land Disposal Facility Owners, Warning They Jeopardize Superfund Credibility, [Current
Developments] 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 29, at 1244 (Nov. 16, 1984).
This Note uses the terms "hazardous waste" and "hazardous substances" to refer to
substances that would qualify as hazardous under either CERCLA or RCRA.
5. The Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982), regulates the de-
velopment, testing, and use of chemical substances. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982), regulates pesticides and similar toxic
substances.
6. E.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
7. E.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982), as
amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 1567 (1977); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-10 (1982).
8. See Florini, Issues of Federalism in Hazardous Waste Control: Cooperation or
Confusion?, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. Rav. 307 (1982); Special Report: Success of Georgia Environ-
mental Program Shows States Can Be Fully in Charge of Federal Programs, Ledbetter
Says, [Current Developments] 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 30, at 1291 (Nov. 23, 1984). The
level of state participation may not always be as high as desirable. See, e.g., EPA Says
States Need 84 Percent Staff Boost Over Fiscal 1983 Levels for Cleanup Program, [Current
Developments] 15 ENv'T Rae. (BNA) No. 34, at 1396 (Dec. 21, 1984).
9. See, e.g., New Hampshire Hazardous Waste Management Act, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 147-A (Supp. 1983).
10. See, e.g., New Jersey Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
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With the increasingly comprehensive federal regulation of the
hazardous waste disposal industry, the cost of safe and legal dispo-
sal has skyrocketed." The huge costs have forced some companies
out of business 12 and have prompted other companies to evade reg-
ulations by using illegal disposal methods.' 3 Often the companies
go into bankruptcy. Conflicts then arise between the goals, policies,
and provisions of the Federal Bankruptcy Code 4 and the goals,
policies, and provisions of state and federal hazardous waste laws.' 5
The purpose of this Note is to identify the basic conflicts be-
tween the Bankruptcy Code and hazardous waste laws and to pro-
pose a balancing approach to resolve these conflicts. Part II of this
Note identifies points of conflict that have arisen in recent cases
and characterizes the conflict as a clash between the economic in-
terests under the Bankruptcy Code and public health and safety
§§ 13:1K-6 to -14 (West Supp. 1984-85). The New Jersey law requires industrial facilities to
submit detailed plans for decontaminating equipment, buildings, and dump sites if a facility
is to be closed, sold or transferred. See Texaco Moves Sludge from Refinery to Comply with
New Jersey Waste Cleanup Act, [Current Developments] 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 37, at
1479 (Jan. 11, 1985).
11. See Rosenbaum, Bankruptcy and Environmental Regulation: An Emerging Con-
flict, 13 ENVTh. L. REP., (ENvTL. L. INST.) 10099, 10099 (1983). Cleanup of old sites is also
incredibly expensive. The EPA recently approved the United States Army's plan to clean up
the dumpsite at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal for $357 million. Army Proposes $357 Million
Plan for Rocky Mountain Arsenal Cleanup, [Current Developments] 15 ENVT REP. (BNA)
No. 28, at 1231 (Nov. 9, 1984); see also In re Charles George Land Reclamation Trust, 30
Bankr. 918, 921 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (cleanup cost estimated at $5-10 million with a
diagnostic study alone at $2 million).
12. Rosenbaum, supra note 11, at 10099. Because many hazardous waste disposal com-
panies are financially unstable anyway, the increased cost of compliance probably will lead
to further bankruptcies. Id.
13. See EPA Guidance Memorandum Regarding CERCLA. Enforcement Against
Bankrupt Parties, at 4 (May 24, 1984) [hereinafter cited as EPA Guidance for Bank-
ruptcy]. The increased cost of compliance for honest waste haulers and the large profit mar-
gins available to illegal dumpers may lead to the involvement of organized crime in the
hazardous waste disposal industry. Organized Crime and Hazardous Waste Disposal: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 31-35 (1980) (Testimony of Harold
Kaufman). Illegal dumpers may be even more prevalent under the new 1984 regulations
because the costs of compliance will be much greater and many more businesses are covered.
14. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1982), as amended by
the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333. This Note refers to the Bankruptcy Reform Act, as amended in 1984, as the
Bankruptcy Code.
15. This Note concentrates on' the goals and policies of CERCLA because it is
designed to address directly the problem of cleaning up hazardous waste dumpsites. RCRA
also directly addresses the problem of proper disposal. Certain types of hazardous waste
may fit within the provisions of the Clean Water Act or the Clean Air Act. State laws may
be similar to any of the federal acts.
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concerns under CERCLA and RCRA. Part III proposes a "balanc-
ing of the equities" approach to resolve these conflicts. This ap-
proach considers three factors: qualitative interests, quantitative
interests, and the good or bad faith of the parties. Part IV con-
cludes that a balancing test is necessary to ensure the proper reso-
lution of the competing concerns at issue and suggests that the
courts should balance the equities according to Congress' ex-
pressed priorities.
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
A. Identifying the Context
Recent cases that have confronted the basic conflict'6 between
the Bankruptcy Code and hazardous waste disposal laws have ad-
16. Numerous factors may affect the nature of the conflict between hazardous waste
laws and the Bankruptcy Code. See Aaron, Bankruptcy Stays of Environmental Regula-
tion: Harvest of Commercial Timber as an Introduction to a Clash of Policies, 12 ENVTL. L.
1, 1-2 (1981). For example, the debtor may be responsible under RCRA or CERCLA as a
past or present owner of the site, see RCRA § 3004, 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1982); CERCLA §
107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1982), a past or present generator of the hazardous waste,
see RCRA § 3002, 42 U.S.C. § 6922 (1982); CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982), or
a party who arranged for or accepted disposal at the site, see CERCLA § 107(a)(3)-(4), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)-(4) (1982); e.g., In re Charles George Land Reclamation Trust, 30 Bankr.
918, 919 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983). Alternatively or additionally, the debtor may be responsi-
ble for cleanup under analogous state laws. See, e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs (Kovacs H), 53
U.S.L.W. 4068, 4069 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1985) (violation of Ohio water pollution control law, OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 6111 (Page 1977)); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 913 (3d
Cir. 1984), cert. granted sub nom. O'Neill v. City of New York, 53 U.S.L.W. 3584 (U.S. Feb.
19, 1985) (No. 84-805) (violation of N.Y. ENvTL. CONsERv. LAW §§ 27-0900 to -0923 (McKin-
ney 1984)).
Furthermore, the parties may vary. The debtor may be an individual, a corporation, or
an individual acting on behalf of a corporation. E.g., Kovacs II, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4069 (state
suing Kavacs both as a corporate officer and as an individual); United States v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 13 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENvm. L. INST.) 20310 (D.N.H. 1982) (United
States suing Johns-Manville as a corporation). The Bankruptcy Code treats individuals and
corporations differently in some areas. For example, a bankruptcy court will discharge per-
manently the debts of an individual, but the court cannot discharge the debts of a corpora-
tion. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1982). EPA policy is to pursue financially solvent individuals
if the corporation becomes insolvent, especially when the action concerns an individual of-
ficer, or the court could pierce the corporate veil. EPA Guidance for Bankruptcy, supra
note 13, at 30-34.
The party attempting to compel the debtor to clean up the site may be the state, see,
e.g., Kovacs II, 53 U.S.L.W. 4068, the federal government, see, e.g., Johns-Manville, 13
ENvTL. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INsT.) 20310, or private parties seeking to enforce federal statutes,
see, e.g., In re Revere Cooper and Brass, Inc., 29 Bankr. 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 32
Bankr. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
Finally, a debtor's petition may be voluntary or involuntary and may be a Chapter 7
liquidation proceeding or a Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding. Under Chapter 7, the
court appoints a trustee to collect and liquidate the debtor's nonexempt assets and apply
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dressed five principal issues. The first issue is whether the Bank-
ruptcy Code's automatic stay provision applies to government pro-
ceedings that seek to compel a debtor to clean up a hazardous
waste site.17 A second and related issue concerns whether a judg-
ment requiring a debtor to clean up a hazardous waste site is a
"claim" or "debt" that is dischargeable in bankruptcy."' The third
issue is whether the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to abandon
a hazardous waste site when a state law would require cleanup. 19
The fourth issue is whether threats posed by a defendant's hazard-
ous waste disposal site may constitute sufficient cause for dismissal
of the bankruptcy petition.2 0 Finally, the fifth issue concerns the
level of priority to assign government reimbursement claims for
cleaning up a hazardous waste site.2' This section considers each of
these issues in turn.
1. Automatic Stay
The most visible facet of the bankruptcy-hazardous waste con-
flict has been whether the automatic stay provision 22 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code applies to state or federal proceedings to compel a
debtor to clean up a hazardous waste site. In general, under section
362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the filing of a petition in bank-
ruptcy acts to automatically stay most legal proceedings against
the debtor. 23 The purpose of the stay is both to give the debtor a
"breathing spell" by granting immediate temporary relief from
creditors' demands and to preserve the debtor's assets for orderly
and equitable distribution under the Bankruptcy Code.24 The au-
tomatic stay provision, however, is not absolute. If an interested
the proceeds in satisfaction of qualified creditor claims. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1982).
Under Chapter 11, a debtor's assets are not liquidated; instead, the debtor's business contin-
ues under the management of a trustee or a "debtor-in-possession." The debtor and credi-
tors propose a reorganization plan, which the court must approve. The court then estab-
lishes a schedule for future regular payments of all the debts. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174
(1982).
17. See infra notes 22-82 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 83-103 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 104-25 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 134-54 and accompanying text.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982).
23. Id. Section 362(a) lists 11 categories of stayed proceedings. These provisions cover
basically any attempts to collect money from the debtor. Id.
24. See Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 271 (3d Cir.
1984). See generally H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6296-97 (noting protection that stay gives debtor and credi-
tor) [hereinafter cited as HR. REP. No. 95-595].
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party demonstrates sufficient cause, the bankruptcy court may
provide relief from a stay and thereby allow a legal action to com-
mence or continue. 25 In addition, section 362(b) provides eleven
other exceptions to the automatic stay.26
Subsections (b)(4) and (b)(5)27 are the most relevant excep-
tions for cases concerning the removal of hazardous waste. Both of
these exceptions apply when a governmental unit28 acts to enforce
its police or regulatory powers. Section (b)(4) allows the govern-
ment to commence or continue legal proceedings. 9 Section (b)(5)
permits the enforcement of judgments, other than money judg-
ments, which the government has obtained.3 0 Even if the filing of
the debtor's petition does not automatically stay a particular ac-
tion, a bankruptcy court may still use its general power to issue
orders and injunctions to stay a proceeding.31
Two questions commonly arise concerning whether these ex-
ceptions apply in hazardous waste cases. First, does a governmen-
tal action to compel the debtor to clean up a dumpsite qualify as
an action to enforce police or regulatory power? Because comply-
25. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982). The court may find "cause" for lifting a stay, for exam-
ple, when the value of a creditor's security interest is depreciating, see H.R. REP. No. 95-595,
supra note 24, at 343; Aaron, supra note 16, at 5, when another forum is more appropriate
and desirable, see Comment, In re Johns-Manville Corp.: The Delicate Balance of Fairness
Between Bankruptcy and Products Liability Law, 3 J. LAW & COM. 365, 374 (1983) (noting
concerns raised in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982), regarding whether the state court should decide issues of state law), when the debtor
does not file in "good faith," see, e.g., In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 Bankr. 549, 558-60
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981); see also Comment, supra, at 378, or when the stayed action does
not concern the Bankruptcy Code's goal of preserving the assets of the estate, see H.R. REP.
No. 95-595, supra note 24, at 340-44; see also In re Canarico Quarries, Inc., 466 F. Supp.
1333 (D.P.R. 1979) (noting under prior bankruptcy act that courts should not stay suits
other than actions to collect debts because they would not interfere with administration of
bankruptcy).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1)-(11) (1984).
27. Id. at § 362(b)(4)-(5).
28. The term governmental unit includes state, federal, and municipal governments
and regulatory agencies, see, e.g., In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 660 F.2d 1108, 1114
(6th Cir. 1981), but may not apply to private parties acting under statutory civil enforce-
ment provisions, see In re Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., 32 Bankr. 725, 727 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (citizen environmental group bringing civil enforcement action under Clean Water Act
not acting as "governmental unit"). This Note concentrates on entities that are clearly gov-
ernmental units.
29. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1982).
30. Id. at § 362(b)(5).
31. Id. at § 105(a) (1982) ("The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that
is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title."); see also Aaron, supra
note 16, at 25 (advocating use of § 105(a) in environmental cases for specific restraints in-
stead of depending on broad categories in § 362).
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ing with cleanup orders is extremely expensive,32 courts may char-
acterize the cleanup orders as "money judgments" and, therefore,
refuse to except them. Second, may a court still stay a government
action that does fit within the (b)(4) or (b)(5) exceptions? 33 Be-
cause the scope of these exceptions is unclear, courts have turned
to the limited legislative history34 of the Bankruptcy Code for
clarification.3 5
The legislative history of section (b)(4) specifically identifies
actions to prevent or stop violation of environmental laws, includ-
ing actions to fix damages for these violations, as instances of gov-
ernmental actions to enforce police or regulatory powers .3  The leg-
islative history, however, also emphasizes that Congress intended
that courts construe section (b)(4) narrowly. Congress intended to
permit governmental units to pursue actions to protect the public
health and safety and not to permit government action designed
solely to protect the government's "pecuniary interests. ' 37 In ex-
32. See, e.g., In re Charles George Land Reclamation Trust, 30 Bankr. 918, 921
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (estimating $5-$10 million); Massive Excavation of Waste Planned
as California Begins Cleanup at McColl Dump, [File Binder] 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 26,
at 1063 (Oct. 26, 1984) ($21.5 million superfund allocation).
33. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1982); see, e.g., In re Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., 29
Bankr. 584, 588 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 32 Bankr. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (enjoining citizen
environmental group action because gist of complaint went to prepetition conduct, rather
than postpetition conduct subject to suit under 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) (1982)).
34. Because Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act in a last minute flurry in
1978, the official legislative history is scanty and contrived. For instance, Representative
Edwards and Senator DeConcini, as respective floor managers during the debates, made
identical statements about the scope of the §§ 362(b)(4) and (b)(5) exceptions. 124 Cong.
Rec. H11089, S17406 (daily ed. Sept. 28 and Oct. 6, 1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6444-45 (Rep. Edwards), 6513 (Sen. DeConcini). The Senate and House
reports are also substantially identical. Compare S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5838 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.,
95-989] with H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 24, at 343. See Rosenbaum, supra note 11, at
10100.
35. E.g., In re Kovacs (Kovacs I), 681 F.2d 454, 456 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Johns-Mansville Sales Corp., 13 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INsT.) 20310, 20311 (D.N.H.
1982); see also Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 272 (3d
Cir. 1984). See generally Aaron, supra note 16, at 2.
36. The legislative history states:
[T]hus, [under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1982),] where a governmental unit is suing a
debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer pro-
tection, safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for
violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay.
H. R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 24, at 343; S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 34, at 52 (em-
phasis added).
37. The (b)(4) exception "is intended to be given a narrow construction in order to
permit governmental units to pursue actions to protect the public health and safety and not
to apply to actions by a governmental unit to protect a pecuniary interest in property of the
1044
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cluding the enforcement of money judgments from the (b)(5) ex-
ception, Congress was concerned that the governmental unit
should not receive "preferential treatment to the detriment of all
other creditors. ' 8 Although section 362(b)(5) does not allow ac-
tions to enforce money judgments, the legislative history indicates
that the exception does allow courts to enter money judgments and
to issue and enforce injunctions."39 These few snippets of legisla-
tive history provide the only direct discussion of the intended
scope of the (b)(4) and (b)(5) exceptions. Courts that have ex-
amined this legislative history have reached different results in at-
tempting to resolve the bankruptcy-hazardous waste conflict.
In In re Kovacs (Kovacs i)40 and Ohio v. Kovacs (Kovacs I)
41
the State of Ohio sought to compel Kovacs, both as an individual
and as corporate officer,'42 to clean up the Chem-Dyne site in Ham-
ilton, Ohio. The Chem-Dyne corporation was in the business of
treating, recycling, storing, and disposing of industrial and chemi-
cal wastes. Improper operations allegedly caused the discharge of
toxic and carcinogenic pesticides into Ohio waters in violation of
debtor or property of the estate." H. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 24, at H11089 (remarks of
Rep. Edwards); S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 34, at S17406 (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
38. According to the legislative history,
Since the assets of the debtor are in the possession and control of the bankruptcy
court, and since they constitute a fund out of which all creditors are entitled to share,
enforcement of a governmental unit of a money judgment would give it preferential
treatment to the detriment of all other creditors.
H. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 24, at 343; S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 34, at 52.
39. H. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 24, at 343; S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 34, at 52.
For example, the stay does not apply to proceedings to assess penalties for child labor law
violations, but § 362(b)(5) prevents proceedings to actually recover the amount assessed.
E.g., In re Tauscher, 7 Bankr. 918, 920 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1981).
40. 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 459 U.S. 1167 (1983).
41. 53 U.S.L.W. 4068 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1985). The state first filed suit on September 29,
1976, case no. CV 76-09-0834, Butler County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas. There followed
an agreed order in July 1979, the appointment of a receiver in 1980, and, in September 1980,
the first Kovacs lawsuit (Kovacs I), which applied the automatic stay under Chapter 7. In
addition, in October 1980 the State of Ohio filed a separate action (Kovacs II) arguing that
the judgment against Kovacs is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. See Brief for Petitioner at
4-7, Brief for Respondent at 1-5, Ohio v. Kovacs (Kovacs 11), 53 U.S.L.W. 4068 (U.S. Jan. 9,
1985). The Supreme Court decided the dischargeability issue in Kovacs II. See infra notes
86-103 and accompanying text. In the meantime, the United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers had removed the wastes, and some of the other responsible parties had reimbursed the
government. The Army Corps of Engineers, however, failed to remove all the toxic sub-
stances before some of them permeated the soil. 53 U.S.L.W. at 4069.
42. Kovacs was an officer in the Chem-Dyne corporation and other related corpora-
tions. The government named the other corporations as defendants. See United States v.
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (United States seeking reim-
bursements under CERCLA for cleanup).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
state environmental laws. 43 In 1979, Kovacs signed a stipulation
and judgment entry enjoining him from causing further water pol-
lution and requiring him to remove all the wastes stored at the
Chem-Dyne site.44 Kovacs failed to comply45 with this order, and
in 1980 the state court appointed a receiver. The court order di-
rected the receiver to arrange for cleanup of the Chem-Dyne site,
gave the receiver the power to collect all the money that the defen-
dant owned, and directed Kovacs to cooperate with the receiver to
effect the cleanup. Cleanup proceeded under the receiver's direc-
tion. Kovacs then filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, which
the court converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. Subsequently, Ohio
moved the state court to hold a hearing "to determine Kovacs' cur-
rent employment status and income."'46 Kovacs then moved the
bankruptcy court to apply the automatic stay to prevent the
hearing.
4 7
The bankruptcy court determined that Ohio sought to gain in-
formation about Kovacs' income for purposes of obtaining a court
order requiring Kovacs to apply part of his postpetition earnings to
the receiver's cleanup efforts. 8 In view of this objective, the bank-
ruptcy court held that the State's action was subject to the auto-
matic stay, even though neither the prior stipulation and judgment
entry nor the order appointing a receiver technically gave the state
a "money judgment" under section 362(b)(5). 49 The bankruptcy
court declared that "'no difference [existed] in substance between
43. In the complaint, Ohio alleged that the defendants improperly had stored the car-
cinogenic pesticides endrin, dieldrin, and heptachlor and that the wastes were leaking into
the Great Miami River, killing wildlife and fish, polluting the river, and destroying natural
resources. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2-3, Brief
for Petitioner at 4-5, Ohio v. Kovacs (Kovacs II), 53 U.S.L.W. 4068 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1985).
44. In 1979, wastes stored at the Chem-Dyne site amounted to 850,000 gallons of liq-
uid wastes and 4000 barrels of solid or semi-solid sludges. Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, Ohio v.
Kovacs (Kovacs II), 53 U.S.L.W. 4068 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1985).
45. The Ohio Court of Common Pleas, in appointing the receiver, noted that Kovacs
and other defendants had operated in "flagrant disregard" of the stipulation and judgment
entry. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Ohio v. Kovacs (Kovacs II), 53 U.S.L.W. 5068 (U.S. Jan. 9,
1985). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, characterized
Kovacs' operation as "compliance . . . substantially behind schedule." In re Kovacs, 717
F.2d 984, 985 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd sub nom. Ohio v. Kovacs (Kovacs II), 53 U.S.L.W. 5068
(U.S. Jan. 9, 1985).
46. Kovacs I, 681 F.2d at 455.
47. Id.
48. Id. The Bankruptcy Court assumed that Kovacs' cleanup obligation was not dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy, although that issue was not before the court. Id.; see infra notes
83-103 and accompanying text.
49. Kovacs I, 681 F.2d at 456.
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efforts to collect money from a debtor by securing a court order,
and efforts to enforce a money judgment against him.' 50
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
agreed with the bankruptcy court and held that the automatic stay
prevented Ohio's action because the State sought "what in essence
amounted to a money judgment."51 The court maintained that
Congress intended the (b)(4) and (b)(5) exceptions to permit gov-
ernmental units to enforce their police power through mandatory
injunctions but not through the collection of money.5 2 The Sixth
Circuit opinion thus implied that any injunction requiring the ex-
penditure of funds is a "money judgment" under section
362(b)(5).53
Although the United States Supreme Court vacated and re-
manded the judgment in Kovacs I,54 the Supreme Court's holding
in Kovacs 1155 accepts the Sixth Circuit's reasoning. In Kovacs II
the Court decided that by appointing a receiver and dispossessing
Kovacs, Ohio effectively had converted the cleanup order into an
obligation to pay money.56
In United States v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.57 the United
States and the State of New Hampshire sought injunctions58 to re-
quire the Johns-Manville corporation to take remedial steps to
50. Id. (citation reference omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See In re Penn Terra Ltd., 24 Bankr. 427 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd sub nom.
Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 277-78 (3d Cir. 1984)
(characterizing the Sixth Circuit decision as holding that any injunction which requires
money expenditure is a "money judgment"); United States v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvT.. L. INsT.) 20310, 20311 (D.N.H. 1982) (applying similar reasoning
to the (b)(4) exception).
54. 459 U.S. 1167 (1983). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kovacs I, but va-
cated the judgment and remanded for consideration of the question of mootness. Id. The
mootness issue arose because the bankruptcy court had held that Kovacs' obligation was
dischargeable, In re Kovacs, 29 Bankr. 816 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982), aff'd, 717 F.2d 984 (6th
Cir. 1983), aff'd sub nom. Ohio v. Kovacs (Kovacs II), 53 U.S.L.W. 4068 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1985),
and because the appeal of that decision was pending in the Sixth Circuit at that time. On
remand, the Sixth Circuit held that the Supreme Court's decision in Kovacs II rendered the
automatic stay issue moot in Kovacs I, 755 F.2d 484 (6th Cir. 1985).
55. Kovacs II, 53 U.S.L.W. 4068.
56. Id. at 4071. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's holding in Kovacs II, see infra
text accompanying notes 92-103.
57. 13 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20310 (D.N.H. Nov. 15, 1982).
58. The United States brought this action under the imminent hazard provisions of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1983), and RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 7003 (1983). New Hampshire
based its cause of action on similar state laws and on the common law of nuisance. Johns-
Mansville, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INsT.) at 20310.
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abate the hazards caused by several asbestos dumpsites.59 Johns-
Manville, the world's largest manufacturer and supplier of asbestos
and asbestos products,60 already faced approximately 16,000 prod-
uct liability claims and a "staggering number" of potential future
claims from individuals whose injuries had not yet become appar-
ent. These product liability claims prompted Johns-Manville to file
for reorganization under Chapter 11.61 When Johns-Manville filed
its Chapter 11 petition, the bankruptcy court issued a broad re-
straining order staying all litigation.62 New Hampshire and the
United States argued that section 362(b)(4) excepted their actions
from this stay.
The district court refused to allow the suit, holding that it had
no jurisdiction to interfere with the bankruptcy court's control of
the debtor's assets.63 Three factors influenced the court's decision.
First, the government failed to take any steps to clean up the sites
or to pursue any other responsible parties.6 4 Second, the court em-
phasized that Johns-Manville's bankruptcy was a result of the
huge product liability claims of individuals already injured by the
corporation's asbestos products. 5 Last, in following the reasoning
in Kovacs I, the Johns-Manville court focused on the fact that the
relief sought would require a substantial expenditure of funds from
the debtor's estate.66
The district court read the (b)(4) exception in conjunction
with the (b)(5) exception, which would prevent enforcement of a
59. The plaintiffs also sought an injunction against the individual owners of the sites.
Johns-Manville had generated the asbestos and had arranged for its disposal, but did not
own the sites involved. The relief sought included an injunction requiring the individual
defendants to note on their deeds the presence of the asbestos and to allow government
inspection of the sites. The court indicated that the plaintiffs could have severed the suit
and proceeded against the individual defendants without being restrained by the automatic
stay. Johns-Manville, 13 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INsT.) at 20311.
60. When Johns-Manville filed its petition, it was a "Fortune 500" company and "a
paradigm of success of corporate America." In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 727, 729
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying motions to dismiss petition).
61. Id.
62. United States v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 13 ENvm. L. REP. (ENvrL. L. INsT.) at
20310.
63. Id. at 20312.
64. Id. at 20311-12. The court stated that the governments' reasons for not proceeding
to finance the cleanup were unclear, but noted that "the respective government plaintiffs
[may] feel that the funds available to them are inadequate to provide the relief actually
sought herein." Id. at 20310 n.7.
65. Id. at 20312.
66. Id. at 20311-12. The court also emphasized that the government could have
cleaned up the site and then proceeded against the debtor for reimbursement. Id. at 20312.
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"money judgment" if entered under (b)(4).7 The court read the
legislative history suggesting a narrow construction of the (b)(4)
exception as merely restating the rule of law that a "plaintiff can-
not transform a claim for damages into an equitable action by ask-
ing for an injunction that orders the payment of money."65 Under
this approach, the court characterized the government action as an
action to obtain a money judgment or to recover money damages,
rather than a regulatory action. 9 The court indicated that the
(b)(4) exception applies only when the government seeks relief
that does not require any expenditure of funds and thus does not
conflict directly with the bankruptcy court's control of the prop-
erty.70 The exception, therefore, did not apply to the government
action in this case.
The Third Circuit has taken a different approach to injunc-
tions requiring monetary expenditure. In United States v. Price
71
the United States sought a preliminary injunction to compel the
defendant to fund a diagnostic study to determine whether his
dormant landfill was dangerous. 72 The district court followed the
reasoning in Kovacs I and Johns-Manville and found that an in-
junction would be inappropriate because it would amount to a
money judgment.7 3 The United States Court of Appeals for the
67. Id. at 20312.
68. 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvT. L. INST.) at 20311 (quoting United States v. Price (Price
I), 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1067 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir.
1982), which quotes Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 715 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 961 (1979)). In dicta the court expressly repudiated the language in Price L United
States v. Price (Price II), 688 F.2d 204, 211 (3d Cir. 1982). One commentator criticized
Johns-Manville for relying so heavily on Kovacs I, which was vacated and remanded, and
Price I, which was affirmed on appeal only with express disavowal of the lower court's rea-
soning. See Rosenbaum, supra note 11, at 10101; see also Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae, at 14 n.13, Ohio v. Kovacs (Kovacs II), 53 U.S.L.W. 4068 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1985).
69. 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvrL. L. INST.) at 20312.
70. 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982). The court's holding is basically jurisdictional. The
court notes that the parties still may apply to the bankruptcy court for relief from the stay.
Id. The 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments reduce the all-inclusive nature of the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction under the 1978 Code.
71. Price I, 523 F. Supp. 1055, afl'd, Price II, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
72. Huge amounts of extremely toxic wastes from Price's landfill in Pleasantville, New
Jersey leaked out, contaminating local wells and threatening the city water supply. Price
had been disposing of highly toxic chemicals by pouring waste into the dump or by burying
drums of toxic waste under other refuse. The leaking chemicals were carcinogenic, muta-
genic, and teratogenic, posing a grave danger to public health. The United States, therefore,
sought an injunction under RCRA's imminent danger provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7003 (1983).
Price I, 523 F. Supp. at 1058-68.
73. Price I, 523 F. Supp. at 1067. Kovacs I, Johns-Manville, and Price I rely on Jaffee
v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979). The plaintiff in
Jaffee sued the United States Government for intentially exposing him and other soldiers to
1985] 1049
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1037
Third Circuit upheld the district court's decision to deny the pre-
liminary injunction because the interim relief that the injunction
required could complicate pending litigation. 4 The Third Circuit,
however, rejected the district court's reasoning and devoted most
of its attention to suggesting a proper analysis for deciding
whether to characterize a certain remedy as money damages or as
an equitable injunction.
7 5
The Third Circuit expressly rejected the Kovacs' court's auto-
matic application of a "money judgment" label to any injunction
requiring expenditures. The Third Circuit noted that "in contem-
porary times, almost everything costs something. An injunction
which does- not compel some expenditure or loss of monies may
often be an effective nullity. '7 6 The Third Circuit focused on the
nature of the injury and considered whether the traditional remedy
for such an injury was a judgment for money damages or an equi-
table injunction. 7 According to the Third Circuit, courts tradition-
ally award money damages as compensation for past injury, while
they grant injunctions to protect against future harm. Further-
more, mere payment of money will not suffice when an injunction
is required. The amount of money needed to comply with an in-
junction is not specified, while the amount of money damages re-
quired is reducible to a "sum certain" as liquidated damages. 8
radiation. The court held that the plaintiff's request for an order requiring the government
to provide all necessary medical care and treatment was essentially an action for money
damages, as a traditional form of past damages in compensation for medical costs. Id. at
715. The Jaffee court, however, also held that the plaintiff's request that the court require
the government to give warnings of the medical risks to other class members was a request
for equitable relief. Although compliance with this order would require monetary expense,
the payment of money could not satisfy that claim. Id.; see Penn Terra Ltd., 733 F.2d at
276.
74. Price II, 688 F.2d at 211.
75. Id. at 211-14. The court noted that courts should use the traditional balancing test
for issuing an injunction even if the remedy sought is untraditional or novel. Id. at 211.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 212; Penn Terra Ltd., 733 F.2d at 278. "Mandatory" injunctions, which re-
quire the defendant to take some affirmative action, are traditionally more difficult to obtain
than "prohibitory" injunctions, which prevent the defendant from acting. In the hazardous
waste context, the Third Circuit noted that even a "mandatory" injunction may be an ap-
propriate preliminary remedy when such an injunction requires the defendant to take some
affirmative action merely to preserve the status quo until a final decision is possible. Price
II, 688 F.2d at 212. In the mining regulations context, the Third Circuit noted that the
mandatory/prohibitory distinction would be less clear and less useful in environmental cases
because both types of injunctive relief may cost money and because a "prohibitory" injunc-
tion not to pollute may also be a "mandatory" injunction to remove wastes. Penn Terra
Ltd., 733 F.2d at 278 n.12.
78. Price II, 688 F.2d at 212.
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Under this approach, the Third Circuit found that an injunction
requiring the defendant to fund a diagnostic study of his hazard-
ous waste dump site would be an appropriate preliminary injunc-
tion. Even though the injunction would require a monetary expen-
diture, the study would be the first step in the remedial process to
prevent future harm, not a compensation for past injury.79
The court in Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Environmen-
tal Resourcess0 later adopted this same analysis in defining the
scope of the section 362(b)(5) exception in the context of mining
regulations."' The Third Circuit held that an injunction requiring
the debtor to take certain remedial and reclamation actions re-
quired under state mining regulations was not a money judgment
under section 362(b)(5). Instead, the court viewed the state's ac-
tion as an attempt to obtain an equitable injunction to prevent fu-
ture harm to the environment. The injunction, therefore, was not
subject to the automatic stay. 2
2. Dischargeability
Closely related to the automatic stay issue83 is the issue of
whether a state judgment requiring an individual debtor to clean
up a hazardous waste site is a "claim" or "debt" dischargeable in
bankruptcy. With some exceptions, 4 bankruptcy acts to discharge
a debtor of responsibility for prepetition "claims" and "debts," in-
cluding judgments of personal liability.8
79. Id.
80. 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
81. Id. at 276-77.
82. Id. at 278-79. In a footnote, the Supreme Court in Kovacs If distinguished Penn
Terra Ltd. because in Penn Terra Ltd. "there had been no appointment of a receiver who
had the duty to comply with state law and who was seeking money from the bankrupt."
Ohio v. Kovacs (Kovacs II), 53 U.S.L.W. 4068, 4071 n.11 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1985).,
83. The automatic stay generally remains in effect until discharge. 11 U.S.C. §
362(c)(2) (1982). If the bankruptcy court eventually discharges a debt or claim, exemption
from the automatic stay will not help the government because a dischargeable judgment
would not be enforceable. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1982).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1984) (10 exceptions); see infra note 99.
85. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1982); 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1982). Under 11 U.S.C. § 524(a), a
bankruptcy discharge erases the bankrupt's "debt," which is defined as "liability on a
claim." 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1982). A "claim" is defined as a:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equi-
table, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives
rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced
to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or
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In Ohio v. Kovacs (Kovacs II)86 the State of Ohio sought a
declaratory judgment that Kovacs' obligation under the prior state
court orders requiring cleanup was not dischargeable.8 7 Ohio ar-
gued that Kovacs' obligation was neither a "claim" nor a "debt"
susceptible to discharge under section 727(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code, but was instead a right to an equitable remedy.88 According
to the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code, the right to an
equitable remedy is not a "claim" unless the plaintiff seeks a rem-
edy for a breach of performance and that breach also gives rise to
an alternative right to payment.89 Ohio argued that Kovacs' obliga-
tion was based on a violation of law rather than a "breach of per-
formance." 90 Furthermore, according to the state, there was no al-
ternative right to payment, only a right to effect the cleanup
order.9 1
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Bankruptcy
Court9" and the Sixth Circuit,93 both of which viewed Ohio's efforts
to compel Kovacs to finance the cleanup as attempts to enforce an
alternative right to payment94 and to obtain compensation for the
state's pecuniary losses.95 The Sixth Circuit expressly reaffirmed
its Kovacs I rationale in defining Kovacs' obligation under the
prior judgment as a "claim" or "debt" dischargeable in bank-
unsecured.
11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982).
86. 53 U.S.L.W. 4068 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1985).
87. In re Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd sub nom. Ohio v. Kovacs (Kovacs
II), 53 U.S.L.W. 4068 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1985).
88. 717 F.2d at 986; see supra notes 45-54 (discussing Kovacs 1).
89. 717 F.2d at 986; see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 17, Ohio v. Ko-
vacs (Kovacs II), 53 U.S.L.W. 4068 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1985).
90. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 17-18, Ohio v. Kovacs (Kovacs II), 53
U.S.L.W. 4068 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1985); Brief for Petitioner at 14-19, Ohio v. Kovacs (Kovacs II),
53 U.S.L.W. 4068 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1985). In discussing § 101(4)(b), Representative Edwards
noted that a creditor entitled to specific performance would have a "claim" in states in
which "a judgment for specific performance may be satisfied by an alternative right to pay-
ment ... ." Representative Edwards, however, also noted that "rights to an equitable rem-
edy for a breach of performance ... which. . . [do] not give rise to a right to payment are
not 'claims' and would therefore not be susceptible to discharge in bankruptcy." 124 CONG.
REc. 32,393 (1978).
91. Kovacs II, 717 F.2d at 987; see Brief for Petitioner at 14-19, Ohio v. Kovacs (Ko-
vacs II), 53 U.S.L.W. 4068 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1985).
92. Brief for Petitioner at 19-27, Ohio v. Kovacs, 53 U.S.L.W. 4068 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1985).
93. In re Kovacs, 29 Bankr. 816 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982), affd, 717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir.
1983), aff'd sub nom. Ohio v. Kovacs (Kovacs II), 53 U.S.L.W. 4068 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1985).
94. In re Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd sub nom. Ohio v. Kovacs, 53
U.S.L.W. 4068 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1985).
95. 29 Bankr. at 818; 717 F.2d at 986-87.
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ruptcy.96 Because Kovacs could perform his obligation only by the
payment of money, the Sixth Circuit held that Ohio sought a
"money judgment" and thus had a dischargeable claim absent
some exemption.
97
The Supreme Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit and held
that Kovacs' obligation to clean up the site essentially had been
converted into a money judgment because the receiver was in con-
trol of the site and Kovacs had been dispossessed.9 8 The Supreme
Court went on to reject Ohio's argument that the criminal restitu-
tion exception to dischargeability applied in this case.99 The state
characterized Kovacs' obligation to comply with Ohio's environ-
96. 717 F.2d at 987-88.
97. Id. The Supreme Court's characterization of Kovacs' obligation as a money judg-
ment could be extended to the automatic stay analysis. See supra text accompanying notes
49-56.
98. Kovacs 11, 53 U.S.L.W. 4068. The decision, however, should be limited to its facts
because the Court emphasized the narrowness of its holding. Id. at 4071. The Court pointed
out that Kovacs still would be subject to criminal prosecution for the original violation and
contempt proceedings for failing to comply with the state court orders. Furthermore, the
Court did not decide what the legal consequences would have been if Kovacs had filed his
bankruptcy petition before the appointment of the receiver. In that situation a bankruptcy
trustee would have had the various powers and duties that the Bankruptcy Code authorizes.
The Court also emphasized that its decision addressed only the dischargeability of the af-
firmative duty to clean up the site and to pay money for the cleanup. The Court's decision
did not address the dischargeability of the state court injunctions against contributing fur-
ther to the pollution or bringing toxic wastes to the site.
Finally, the Court admitted that any person in possession of the site must comply with
Ohio's environmental regulations and could not refuse to remove the source of the pollution.
Id. The only parties that the Court lists, however, are Kovacs or anyone receiving the prop-
erty upon abandonment, or a vendee from the trustee or receiver. The Court made no men-
tion of the trustee's obligation to comply with state laws. Id.; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1968)
(trustee must "operate and manage" business in compliance with state laws).
99. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1982). Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code exempts certain
debts from discharge. Id. § 523(a). For example, a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to or
for the benefit of a governmental unit is not dischargeable unless considered compensation
for the government's actual pecuniary loss. Id. § 523(a)(7). In addition, courts have excepted
orders of criminal restitution on the theory that no creditor/debtor relationship exists be-
tween the state and a criminal ordered to pay restitution. E.g., Matter of Cox, 33 Bankr. 657
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983); In re Button, 8 Bankr. 692 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981); cf. In re
Daugherty, 25 Bankr. 158 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (similar ruling under prior bankruptcy
act). But see In re Brown, 39 Bankr. 820 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (discussing a line of
cases basing discharge upon a determination of whether the restitution order is "punitive"
and thus nondischargeable or "compensatory" and thus dischargeable). Courts characterize
some criminal restitution orders as equivalent to fines and penalties that regulate behavior
by threatening financial retribution. E.g., In re Cox, 33 Bankr. at 659; In re Button, 8
Bankr. at 692. Characterizing a state order as either compensatory or punitive, however,
may be especially difficult when the amount of a civil penalty for environmental violations is
graduated depending upon the costs of compliance. See Aaron, supra note 16, at 7.
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mental laws as a civil enforcement of criminal laws.100 Because the
Bankruptcy Code addresses financial concerns and not criminal
matters, Ohio argued that Kovacs' obligation should not qualify as
a claim or debt in bankruptcy.' 0' The Supreme Court recognized
that Ohio's assessment of a money penalty against Kovacs would
have escaped discharge under section 523(a)(7), but refused to
characterize Kovacs' obligation as the equivalent of such a fine or
penalty. 02 Instead, the Court characterized the affirmative cleanup
order as the equivalent of a companion order requiring Kovacs to
pay money for damages to natural resources, noting that both or-
ders served to remedy a statutory violation.
0 3
3. Abandonment
If the state enforces a cleanup order against a debtor who
owns a hazardous waste dump site, the logical response of the trus-
tee or the debtor-in-possession may be an attempt to abandon the
property.104 Section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee or
debtor-in-possession to abandon property that is "burdensome" or
of inconsequential value to the estate. 0 5 Upon abandonment, the
debtor or another party with a possessory interest obtains title to
the property.
In In re Quanta Resources Corp.10 6 the trustee filed a notice of
100. Brief for Petitioner at 23, Kovacs I.
101. Id. In the amicus brief in Kovacs II, the United States noted that the discharge
exception for debts based on the debtor's willful and malicious injury to another's property,
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1982), might also cover hazardous waste cleanup orders when the
debtor's conduct is in "flagrant disregard" of court orders. Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18 n.19, Kovacs I.
102. Kovacs II, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4069-70. But cf. In re Daugherty, 25 Bankr. 158 (E.D.
Tenn. 1982) (under prior bankruptcy act, no discharge for civil penalty assessed against
debtor for violation of mining laws, even though penalty amount was to be paid into state
fund to provide for other surface reclamation).
103. Kovacs II, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4070.
104. See In re Charles George Land Reclamation Trust, 30 Bankr. 918, 923 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1983). Following a request by a party in interest, the court may order the trustee to
abandon burdensome property. 11 U.S.C. § 554(b) (1982). In Kovacs H1 the Supreme Court
expressly did not decide what would have happened if the lower court had appointed a
bankruptcy trustee before the receiver. In a footnote, however, the Court assumed that a
trustee may have been able to abandon the property. Kovacs II, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4071 n.12.
105. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982).
106. 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (Quanta I), cert. granted sub nom. O'Neill v. City of
New York, 53 U.S.L.W. 3589 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985) (No. 84-805). In a companion case, In re
Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted sub nom. O'Neill v. City
of New York, 53 U.S.L.W. 3584 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985) (Quanta II) (No. 84-805), which dealt
with the same debtor's property in New Jersey, the Third Circuit reiterated its holding in
Quanta I, identifying the determinative issue in both cases as whether the trustee's interest
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intent to abandon a disposal site in which fuel storage tanks con-
tained over 500,000 gallons of chemical waste and waste oil, includ-
ing at least 70,000 gallons contaminated with extremely toxic
PCBs.10 7 Because bringing the property into compliance with the
state hazardous waste disposal laws would be extremely expensive,
the trustee argued that the property was burdensome to the estate
and, therefore, the court should allow abandonment. 08 The state
argued that abandonment would amount to unlawful "disposal"
under state hazardous waste disposal laws because abandonment
would revest title in the debtor, 10 9 who was unable to remedy the
hazard. 110
The Third Circuit found that Congress did not intend that the
abandonment provision of the Bankruptcy Code preempt all state
regulation."' The court based its decision upon cases under the
prior Bankruptcy Act that refused to allow abandonment when im-
portant state laws protected the public interest.12 In addition, the
court found no express preemption of state regulations within sec-
tion 554. Instead, the court found evidence implying congressional
intent not to subordinate state regulation of hazardous waste dis-
posal to the bankruptcy abandonment power."' This evidence in-
cluded the provision of automatic stay exceptions for the enforce-
ment of police and regulatory power" 4 and the requirement, under
in preserving the estate should prevail over the public interest in containing such hazards.
Id. at 928-29.
107. Quanta I, 739 F.2d at 913.
108. Id. at 914.
109. According to the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act,
"[albandonment may be to any party with a possessory interest in the property aban-
doned." S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 34, at 2.
110. Quanta I, 739 F.2d at 914. Because the assets of the debtor were in the hands of
the trustee, under bankruptcy law, the debtor would have no funds to effect the cleanup.
111. Id. at 916.
112. Id. at 916-18 (discussing Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952))
(trustee not allowed to abandon worthless barges in harbor in violation of federal laws
prohibiting harbor obstruction, even though cost of removing barges was much greater than
their value); In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
683 (1942) (trustee for railroad not allowed to abandon service on unprofitable branch line
in violation of state law); In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 BANK. CT. DEC. (CRR) 277 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1974) (permission to abandon conditioned on trustees' expending funds to close under-
ground system of steam pipes, vents, and manholes, because abandonment without proper
treatment would create health and safety hazards); In re Adelphi Hospital, 579 F.2d 726 (2d
Cir. 1978) (trustee for bankrupt hospital allowed to abandon medical records in violation of
state law requiring maintenance of the records of insolvent hospitals).
113. Quanta 1, 739 F.2d at 918.
114. Id. at 918 (discussing 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)-(5) (1982)); see supra notes 27-82 and
accompanying text.
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28 U.S.C. § 959(b), that a trustee or debtor-in-possession manage
and operate the property in compliance with state law.' 15 Although
technically the trustee's "abandonment" of property would not
qualify as "management" or "operation" of the debtor's property,
the court read section 959(b) as evidence that Congress had not
"unmistakenably ordained" that the trustee's powers override
state law.
1 6
The provisions in the Bankruptcy Code for equitable consider-
ations, along with the traditional treatment of bankruptcy courts
as courts of equity, also convinced the Quanta I court that Con-
gress did not intend complete federal preemption of state regula-
tions." 7 Instead, the court reasoned that federal bankruptcy law
would preempt state law only to the extent that equitable princi-
ples required the abrogation of state laws that interfere with liqui-
dating the debtor's estate."'
In applying these equitable principles, the Quanta I court bal-
anced the relative weight of the state's interest in protecting the
public health against the federal interest in preserving the debtor's
estate for distribution to creditors." 9 The court found that the
public interest in protecting against the great dangers of improper
toxic waste disposal outweighed the potential damage to the
debtor's estate caused by the required expenditures. 20 Absent a
115. Quanta I, 739 F.2d at 919-20. Section 959(b) provides:
[A] trustee, receiver or manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the
United States, including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property
in his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the valid laws of the
state in which such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or posses-
sor thereof would be bound to do if in possession thereof.
28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982). Section 959(a) provides that a party may bring suit against trust-
ees, receivers, or managers, including debtors-in-possession, without leave of the court that
appointed them. See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text; see also In re Revere Cop-
per and Brass, Inc., 29 Bankr. 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 32 Bankr. 725 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1983) (holding that § 959 applies to postpetition conduct and does not allow suits based on
debtor's prepetition activities that violated environmental regulations).
116. Quanta I, 739 F.2d at 920. The Quanta I dissent, however, argued that § 959(b)
could not be construed to compel the trustee to "operate" property in liquidation proceed-
ings. Id. at 926 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 921-22.
118. Id.
119. Id. The court considered that the state regulations advanced an important policy
and viewed abandonment as a severe violation of the regulations. The facts of Quanta I,
therefore, more closely resemble the serious violations found in Ottenheimer, 198 F.2d at
290, and in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 BANK. CT. DEC. (CRR) 277 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1974),
than the merely technical violations of a less important state regulation as in In re Adelphi
Hospital Corp., 579 F.2d at 728-29.
120. Quanta I, 739 F.2d at 921.
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clear indication that Congress intended to allow "the substitution
of governmental action for citizen compliance," these equitable
principles convinced the court to prohibit the trustee from aban-
doning hazardous wastes that would then require "governmental
cleanup by default.
'121
The dissenting judge in Quanta I found the majority's balanc-
ing of interests unnecessary and impermissible because section 554
clearly allows abandonment without any exceptions analogous to
the exceptions provided for the automatic stay. 2 2 The dissent fur-
ther attacked the majority's holding for raising a substantial ques-
tion under the takings clause of the fifth amendment. 23 The Su-
preme Court has directed that courts avoid the fifth amendment
question by construing the Bankruptcy Code in a way that does
not destroy the interests of secured creditors.'2 4 Unlike the major-
ity, the Quanta I dissent focused on the interests of the creditors,
who were not responsible for placing contaminated oil on the site.
Furthermore, the terms of the state laws did not put the creditors
on notice that eventually they might become liable for the cost of
cleaning up the results of their debtor's unlawful waste disposal.
125
4. Dismissal
In some cases, the serious threat that a debtor's hazardous
waste disposal site poses may amount to sufficient cause for dis-
missal of the bankruptcy petition. A Chapter 7 liquidation pro-
ceeding may be dismissed "for cause" under section 707,126 and a
Chapter 11 reorganization petition may be dismissed or converted
121. Id.; see also In re T.P. Long Chem. Co., 45 Bankr. 278, 286 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1985) (following Quanta and recognizing "public policy" exception to trustee's abandon-
ment power).
122. Quanta I, 739 F.2d at 924 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 925 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o per-
son shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
124. Quanta I, 739 F.2d at 924 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Secur-
ity Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982)). The majority answered this concern by asserting that
state enforcement of environmental regulations is not a "taking" but a permissible "regula-
tion." Id. at 922 n..
125. Quanta I, 739 F.2d at 926 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
126. Section 707 of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice and a hearing
and only for cause, including-
(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors; and
(2) nonpayment of any fees or charges required under chapter 123 of title 28.
11 U.S.C. § 707 (1982). This list of causes is merely illustrative and not exhaustive. H.R. REP.
No. 95-595, supra note 24, at 380, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6336.
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to a Chapter 7 petition "for cause" under section 1112.127
In In re Charles George Land Reclamation Trust128 the court
found cause for equitable dismissal in view of the serious and im-
mediate danger that the debtor's contaminated landfill posed to
the public drinking water supply. 2 ' Because the debtor's facility
was in such flagrant violation of state and federal hazardous waste
laws, the court found that a trustee could not manage the property
in compliance with state law under section 959(b). 130 In addition,
the court noted that a willing trustee would be impossible to find
because of the enormous potential liability under CERCLA for a
trustee managing a landfill in violation of so many regulations. 131
In view of the serious threat to public safety posed by the
ongoing nuisance and the impossibility of administering the estate
in bankruptcy, the court concluded that the possibility of a divi-
dend to creditors"' was not sufficient to outweigh the danger to
public safety. Furthermore, the court concluded that dismissal
would allow the state and federal authorities to take immediate
steps to abate the hazard.1
3 3
127. 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (1982). Courts will consider the best interests of the creditors
and the estate in choosing between conversion or liquidation. "Cause" includes unreasona-
ble delay by the debtor, as under § 707, and evidence that the reorganization plan will not
function effectively. See id. § 1112(b)(1)-(9).
128. 30 Bankr. 918 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983).
129. The EPA had identified the Charles George landfill as one of the worst hazardous
waste sites in the country and assigned the landfill a high priority on the superfund list. The
EPA estimated cleanup costs at $5-$10 million with a diagnostic study alone expected to
cost $2 million. State court orders required the debtor to make payments to a trust fund to
finance the cleanup and to take other remedial action. Other litigation was pending. In addi-
tion, after the filing of the petition, the debtor's landfill discharged huge amounts of con-
taminated leachate, either intentionally or accidentally, into a catch basin that eventually
emptied into the Merrimac River. The Merrimac River was the main source of public drink-
ing water. Id. at 920-21.
130. Id. at 921; see also In re 30 Hilltop Street Corp., 42 Bankr. 57 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1984) (dismissing petition of nursing home because serious violations prevented administra-
tion in bankruptcy). See supra note 115 for a discussion of § 959(b).
131. Charles George, 30 Bankr. at 923-24.
132. The State and municipality amounted to 75% of the creditors, and both sought
dismissal. Id. at 922. Both creditors also argued that the cleanup costs would be an adminis-
trative claim against the estate, thus leaving little, if anything, for the other creditors. Id.
133. The probability of an attempt to abandon the property also influenced the court's
decision, because abandonment, if allowed, merely would revest title in the debtor. Thus,
the debtor "would again be given an opportunity to demonstrate its inability to operate this
facility in compliance with the law," and abandonment would make the automatic stay ap-




The government may seek reimbursement from the debtor's
estate if the government, at its own expense, cleans up a hazardous
waste site. This situation raises the question of what priority status
to give to the government's claim. Generally, the bankruptcy
courts use the assets of a debtor's estate to satisfy first the claims
of secured creditors, then the claims of certain unsecured creditors,
in a given priority order,1 34 and finally, the claims of general un-
secured creditors.13 5 The courts give first priority among the listed
unsecured claims to "administrative expenses," which include "the
actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate
",136
The Environmental Protection Agency contends that courts
should give claims for reimbursement for cleanup costs under
CERCLA first priority as a "necesssary" cost of preserving the es-
tate, because Congress, in the public interest, places the duty to
clean up a hazardous waste site upon the debtor. 37 The Quanta I
court implied, without deciding, that reimbursement for cleanup
costs could qualify as an administrative expense, analogous to costs
of custodial care, insurance, and necessary repairs to the prop-
erty.1 38 The Quanta I dissent, however, found this suggestion "pre-
posterous" in the abandonment context because abandonment
would revest title to the property in the debtor and thereby re-
move the property from the estate to be "preserved."' 39 The
Charles George court also was reluctant to classify these reim-
bursement claims as administrative expenses.
4
1
In certain cases, a bankruptcy court may assign a creditor
"superpriority" over all other claims.' 4 ' In In re Berg Chemical
134. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1982). Section 507(a) assigns priority among certain unsecured
creditor's claims.
135. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1)-(2). General unsecured creditors usually recover only 10¢ to
20o to the dollar, on a pro rata basis. EPA Guidance for Bankruptcy, supra note 13, at 13.
136. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1982); id. § 507(a)(1) (1982).
137. EPA Guidance for Bankruptcy, supra note 13, at 15-16. The EPA relies on Ot-
tenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1952) (under prior bankruptcy act court or-
dered trustee to spend money as administrative expense to remove barges creating hazard-
ous nuisance in harbor).
138. Quanta I, 739 F.2d at 922-23; see also In re T.P. Long Chem. Co., 45 Bankr. 278,
289 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (granting administrative expense priority for cleanup expenses
only to extent of unsecured assets).
139. Quanta I, 739 F.2d at 926 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
140. Charles George, 30 Bankr. at 922.
141. 11 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1982). A government cleaning up a hazardous waste site may
be able to receive superpriority status if the government can prove that: (1) it had a claim
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Co.142 the court granted superpriority status to the city of New
York in return for the city's agreement to finance the cleanup of
the debtor's hazardous waste site because no other funds were
available. 143 The chemical wastes stored and leaking on the prem-
ises 144 posed a potential danger to public health and lessened the
prospect for a profitable sale of the debtor's interest in the prop-
erty.145 The "superpriority," along with a first lien, granted the city
first rights in the proceeds of a postcleanup sale. 146
Legislation also may create similar superpriority status for re-
imbursement claimants under federal and state hazardous waste
disposal laws. Congress has considered bills amending CERCLA to
provide that governmental claims against the debtor for costs of
removal or remedial action have priority over all other claims
against the debtor.' 47 One of the current proposals would allow the
government to impose a federal lien on all real estate owned by a
responsible party to secure payment of response costs in an en-
forcement action.' 48 A few states have enacted similar provisions
under state environmental regulations.' 49 Supreme Court Justice
for administrative expenses, (2) a lien on the debtor's property protected the claim, and (3)
the automatic stay had prevented the use or cleanup of the property. Id.; see EPA Guidance
for Bankruptcy, supra note 13, at 13 n.17.
142. No. 82-B 12052(HB) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1984) (Order Granting First Lien
and "Superpriority").
143. The cleanup cost estimate was $235,000. The debtor-in-possession had no funds,
and the city was unable to obtain any state funds for the cleanup. City Wins Priority in
Bankruptcy Court in Exchange for Cleaning up Waste Site, [File Binder] ENV'T REP.
(BNA) No. 15, at 584 (Aug. 10, 1984).
144. Of the 400 barrels of waste on the property, over 100 barrels were leaking. Some
barrels contained pollutants such as spilled cyanide salt, solvents, and polychlorinated bi-
phenyls (PCBs). Id.
145. Id.
146. In re Berg Chem. Co., No. 82-B 12052(HB) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1984).
147. For example, Representative Florio introduced H.R. 2767, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983). It would add a new section to CERCLA:
§ 116(a) Any claim of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State
for the costs of removal or remedial action taken under Section 104 of this Act for
which a debtor is liable under Section 107 of this Act, and any claim of the United
States for any relief or fine for which a debtor is liable under Section 106 of this Act,
shall have priority over all other classes of claims against such debtor, without regard
to whether such claims are secured.
Id. The bill provided a similar priority for claims under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6971-6979 (1982).
148. See Stafford To Seek Approval for Portions of Administration's Superfund Pro-
posal, [Current Developments] 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 44, at 1788 (Mar. 1, 1985).
149. See, e.g., Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention and Re-
sponse Act, MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 21E § 1-13 (West Supp. 1983); New Jersey Spill
Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f (West 1982).
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Sandra Day O'Connor, however, suggests that states may-be able
to enforce their environmental regulations more effectively against
bankruptcy debtors by assigning cleanup judgments the status of
secured claims or statutory liens.1 0
Critics of this approach have warned that "superliens" may
affect adversely the real estate market by impairing property ti-
tles.151 These critics point out problems in determining which of
the debtor's assets are subject to the lien, how the lien is recorded,
and whether the lien applies to subsequent owners of the property.
In addition, litigants have raised constitutional attacks against the
New Jersey statute, which attaches a "superlien" to all the pol-
luter's assets and property for expenditures made from the state
superfund, without providing for recording or notice of the lien.
52
A recent New Jersey decision held that the statute was constitu-
tional because it did not violate the due process clause, impair con-
tracts, or allow for taking without just compensation.153 Neverthe-
less, state legislatures must word their "superlien" statutes
carefully to avoid creating problems.
54
B. Characterizing the Conflict
In each of the five issues considered, a basic conflict exists be-
tween the economic interests that the Bankruptcy Code protects
and the interests in public health and safety that state and federal
hazardous waste laws protect. Because hazardous waste dump sites
usually pose grave threats of immediate danger to large numbers of
people, the importance of the interest in protecting the public
health and safety is clear and compelling. On the other hand, be-
cause the cost of determining the extent of the danger and taking
effective remedial steps generally is overwhelming, the threat to
the economic interests of the debtor, the government, and other
creditors also is apparent and serious.
Courts resolve this conflict by balancing the economic inter-
ests against the public health and safety interests. The courts,
however, differ in the manner in which they articulate the balanc-
ing process. Some courts articulate a balancing approach under the
150. Kovacs II, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4071 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
151. Schwenke & Lockett, Superlien "Solutions" to Hazardous Waste-Bankruptcy
Conflicts, ABA ENvTL. L. NEWSLETMrER (Winter 1983/84).
152. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f (West 1982).
153. Kessler v. Tarrats, 191 N.J. Super. 273, 466 A.2d 581 (1983); see Schwenke &
Lockett, supra note 151, at 2 n.12.
154. See generally Schwenke & Lockett, supra note 151.
1985] 1061
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
guise of deciding the nature of the requested equitable relief, '55 the
necessity for equitable dismissal, 15 6 or the absence of federal pre-
emption. 157 The Third Circuit in Quanta Resources, for example,
specifically found that damage to the creditors' economic interest
in the assets of the debtor's estate was not sufficient to outweigh
the public interest in protecting against dangers of toxic waste dis-
posal.' 58 Similarly, the court in Charles George held that the need
to protect the public from an ongoing environmental nuisance out-
weighed the creditors' interest in the debtor's estate.'5 9
Some courts, on the other hand, balance the competing inter-
ests more surreptitiously, announcing only their conclusions about
which interests are overriding. The Sixth Circuit twice has charac-
terized Ohio's interest in compelling Kovacs to clean up the Chem-
Dyne site as only pecuniary or economic, virtually ignoring any in-
terest in public health and safety. 160 The Supreme Court recog-
nized some public health and safety concerns,' 6' but concluded
that Ohio's interest was solely economic, in view of the appoint-
ment of a receiver. 162 Similarly, the Johns-Manville court focused
on only the economic interests of the government, finding them in
direct conflict with the bankruptcy court's control of the debtor's
155. See Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir.
1984); see also United States v. Price (Price II), 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
156. See In re Charles George Land Reclamation Trust, 30 Bankr. 918 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1983).
157. See In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (New York case);
In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1984) (New Jersey case); see also Penn
Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
158. 739 F.2d at 921. The court also recognized the possibility of trustees abandoning
dangerous nuclear power plants. Id.
159. 30 Bankr. at 924-25. The court stated:
This was not a bankruptcy case where assets could be liquidated, claims adjudicated,
and a distribution made within a relatively short time, but rather it was and is an
ongoing environmental nuisance that threatens the health, safety and well-being of the
people who surround it. . . . The specter of a dividend in this case was not sufficient to
justify the exposure of the surrounding populace to the possibility of a reoccurrence of
another leachate discharge, similar to that which took place during the Debtor's Chap-
ter 11 proceedings. Dismissal, with the concomitant elimination of the automatic stay,
would allow the EPA and the DEQE to assert their full panoply of powers under the
Federal and State Superfund statutes.
Id. (footnote omitted).
160. In re Kovacs, 681 F.2d at 456 (Kovacs 1) ("To permit the state of Ohio to proceed
with its state court action would subvert the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to rehabilitate
debtors and to give them relief from harassing creditors."); see also In re Kovacs, 717 F.2d
at 988 (Kovacs II) ("The impact of [Ohio's] attempt to realize upon Kovacs' income or
property cannot be concealed by legerdemain or linguistic gymnastics.").




property. Consequently, the court subordinated any interest that
the government might have in public health and safety.163
III. PROPOSING A SOLUTION: A BALANCING APPROACH
These cases reflect an underlying conflict between the debtor's
or creditor's goal of retaining assets and the government's twin
goals of protecting the public health and safety from hazardous
waste and avoiding unnecessary government expenditure. These
kinds of conflicts are inevitable because of the increasing federal
regulation of hazardous waste disposal, the huge expense of effec-
tive cleanup of dump sites, and the limited availability of state or
federal superfund money.1 64 The courts, therefore, should devise a
balancing test to insure the abatement of immediate danger to the
public health and safety, while recognizing the economic interests
threatened by such remedial actions.
Courts should develop a balancing test similar to the "balanc-
ing-of-the-equities" approach that the Supreme Court proposed in
a recent decision addressing a similar conflict between the goals of
the Bankruptcy Code and the goals and policies of federal labor
law. In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco 65 the Supreme Court unani-
mously held that a Chapter 11 debtor may reject a labor union
contract as burdensome to the estate1 66 only if, "after careful scru-
tiny, the equities balance in favor of rejecting the labor con-
163. 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) at 20312 (relying on Missouri v. United States
Bankruptcy Court, 647 F.2d 769 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982)). Accord-
ing to the Johns-Manville court, the Missouri case held that "state grain warehouse laws,
although regulatory in nature,. . . primarily relate to the protection of the pecuniary inter-
est in the debtor's property and not to matters of public health and safety." Id.; see also
Rosenbaum, supra note 11, at 10101.
164. See, e.g., Quanta Resources, 739 F.2d at 921; Rosenbaum, supra note 11, at
10099; Comment, Abating an Imminent Hazard: Injunctive Relief Under the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 32 BUFFALO L. REv.
787, 803 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Abating an Imminent Hazard); City Wins Priority in
Bankruptcy Court in Exchange for Cleaning Up Waste Site, [File Binder] 15 ENV'T REP.
(BNA) No. 15, at 584 (Aug. 10, 1984) (New York State funds not available for cleanup of
Berg Chemical site in New York City).
165. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
166. With certain exceptions and subject to the approval of the court, a trustee may
reject or assume any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)
(1982). Before Bildisco the standard used to determine whether or not a court should reject
a collective bargaining agreement ranged from the traditional "business judgment" standard
to a very strict standard requiring proof that the reorganization would fail if the court did
not permit rejection. The Bildisco balancing test fits in between these two alternative ap-
proaches. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1195-96.
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tract.'16 7 Under this standard, the Court balanced the equities in
the context of a successful reorganization of the business, focusing
on the hardships that each party would suffer if a court allowed or
prohibited rejection."0 8 In addition, the Court emphasized that a
court must focus on not only the quantitative degree of hardship
that the affected parties would suffer, but also "any qualitative dif-
ferences between the types of hardship each may face. "169
In response to Bildisco, Congress amended the Bankruptcy
Code to provide a specially tailored approach for rejecting or modi-
fying labor union contracts. 170 The amendment retains the bal-
ance-of-the-equities test and requires good faith by both the
debtor and the employees in negotiating necessary contract modifi-
cations.17 1 Courts also have considered the good or bad faith of the
parties in attempting to balance the equities.
72
While the federal labor laws and federal or state hazardous
waste laws do not address identical interests, the bankruptcy con-
flicts in the two areas are similar. The courts, therefore, should use
a similar balancing test to resolve the conflicts in both areas.""
167. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1196.
168. Id. at 1197.
169. Id.; see also In re Pesce Baking Co., 43 Bankr. 949 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (con-
sidering financial and psychological impact of losing health, welfare, and pension benefits on
employees who worked for years at low wages to obtain those benefits).
170. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1984).
171. The amendment states:
(c) The court shall approve an application for rejection of a collective bargaining agree-
ment only if the court finds that -
(1) the trustee has, prior to the hearing, made a proposal that fulfills the require-
ments of subsection (b)(1) [requiring that proposed modifications be necessary for reor-
ganization and that the proposal assure "that all creditors, the debtor and all of the
affected parties are treated fairly and equitably"];
(2) the authorized representative of the employees has refused to accept such pro-
posal without good cause; and
(3) the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement.
11 U.S.C. § 1113(c), Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, § 541, 98 Stat. 333, 390-91. See generally 130 CONG. REC. § 8887, at S8891 (daily
ed. June 29, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Hatch, describing this amendment as preserving the
spirit of Bildisco and retaining the same balance of the equities standard).
172. See, e.g., In re Pesce Baking Co. 43 Bankr. 949 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984). The
court in Pesce found bad faith in the debtor company's intentional postpetition violation of
the union contract. The company had hired nonunion employees, especially members of the
major shareholder's family, and allowed other family members to retain union benefits while
acting as management. In addition, the debtor company had kept money the company had
deducted from the employees' wages as union dues, instead of sending the money to the
union. See also In re C. & W. Mining Co., 38 Bankr. 496, 502-03 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)
(good faith of debtor is relevant on question of employees' motivation in making rehabilita-
tion successful).
173. In both cases, the Bankruptcy Code protects the economic interests of the debtor
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Specifically, in the hazardous waste area, a balancing test should
take into account three factors: (1) the qualitative nature of the
hardships that each affected party would suffer if its interests were
subordinated; (2) the quantitative degree of those hardships; and
(3) the good or bad faith of the debtor and the government.
A. Qualitative Differences
As a first step in such a balancing test, courts should identify
the interests of each of the affected parties-the debtor, the gov-
ernment, the creditors, and the public.174 The courts should then
characterize the parties' interests as either economic concerns or
public health and safety concerns so that the court can more easily
determine qualitative differences between the kinds of hardships
that each party would suffer.
Congressional policy, as evidenced in both the Bankruptcy
Code and CERCLA, dictates that courts favor protection of the
public health and safety over protection of economic interests
when balancing the qualitative degree of hardship that the affected
parties suffer. The Bankruptcy Code indicates that in some in-
stances the government interest in protecting the public health
and creditors, while the conflicting laws protect economic and other interests of additional
parties. In the labor law context, employees' interests in keeping their jobs are psychological
as well as financial. In the hazardous waste context, the government's interests are related to
public health and safety as well as to financial soundness. See generally Drebsky & Santoro,
Bankruptcy and Environmental Regulation: A Response, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvTL. L.
INST.) 10262 (1983) (analogizing the Bildisco conflict to the conflict in Johns-Manville); In
re Total Transp. Serv., Inc., 37 Bankr. 904, 907 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984) ("It is apparent
that in Bildisco the Court directs not only a balancing of the interests of the parties, but
also a balancing of the imperatives of the Congress as expressed on the one hand in the
Bankruptcy Code, and on the other, in the National Labor Relations Act.").
174. For example, the Bildisco court identified several factors as bearing on its deci-
sion to allow rejection. These factors include "the likelihood and consequences of liquida-
tion for the debtor absent rejection, the reduced value of the creditors' claims that would
follow from affirmance and the hardship that would impose on them, and the impact of
rejection on the employees." 104 S. Ct. at 1197. The relevant factors in hazardous waste
cases will be different. For example, Bildisco and the resulting amendment, 11 U.S.C. § 1113,
are limited to Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings, in which the successful continuation
of the business as a going concern is a major goal. In hazardous waste cases, however, courts
often convert Chapter 11 petitions to Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings, so that continua-
tion of the business is no longer a major goal. Cf. In re Total Transp. Serv. Inc., 37 Bankr.
904, 907 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984) (in the labor law context, court noted that rejection would
serve no rehabilitative purpose because the debtors' business had ceased operations). In ad-
dition, federal labor law imposes bilateral obligations on employers and employees to negoti-
ate contracts, e.g., National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982), while
federal hazardous waste law imposes a unilateral obligation on parties who create and dis-
pose of hazardous substances, e.g., CERCLA §§ 107, 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982); RCRA
§§ 3002-3005, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1982).
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and safety takes precedence over the economic interests of the
debtor, creditors, and other interested parties. For example, the
Bankruptcy Code provides exemptions for the exercise of the gov-
ernment's regulatory or police power to protect the public health
and safety.17 5 The automatic stay provision of the Code does not
apply to this type of government action unless the action is pri-
marily motivated by economic concerns. 171 Similarly, section 1479,
the provision allowing litigants to remove state court proceedings
to a bankruptcy court, provides an exemption for government ac-
tions to enforce laws and regulations for the protection of the pub-
lic health and safety.17 7 Finally, after the bankruptcy proceedings
have begun, the trustee or debtor-in-possession must comply with
state laws in operating and managing the bankrupt's business.1 78
The automatic stay provision does not prevent actions to enforce
the trustee's compliance.1 79
Similarly, CERCLA180 protects the public health and safety by
addressing the economic interests of the parties involved in the
creation and cleanup of hazardous waste sites. CERCLA's purpose
is twofold: (1) to facilitate the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste
sites; and (2) to place the ultimate financial liability for cleanup
175. See supra notes 22-82 and accompanying text; see also In re Kennise Diversified
Corp., 34 Bankr. 237, 243 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (viewing 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), 11 U.S.C. §
362(b)(5), and 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) as forming a "smooth continuum" requiring compliance
with state regulations).
176. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)-(5) (1982); see supra notes 22-38 and accompanying text.
177. 28 U.S.C. § 1479 (1982); see In re Kennise Diversified Corp., 34 Bankr. 237, 243
n.5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
178. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982). Several courts have found that § 959(b) is evidence that
debtors may not operate businesses in violation of environmental regulations. See, e.g., In re
Canarico Quarries, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1333 (D.P.R. 1979) (action to enjoin violation of Clean
Air Act not subject to automatic stay under prior bankruptcy act); In re Kennise Diversified
Corp., 34 Bankr. 237 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (automatic stay does not apply to action ap-
pointing administrator to operate debtor's dangerously substandard apartment building);
see also In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (§ 959(b) is evidence of
congressional intent that trustee's abandonment power not preempt state environmental
regulations). One bankruptcy court, however, refused to allow a suit under § 959(b) to en-
join a debtor manufacturing company from polluting in violation of the Clean Water Act. In
re Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., 29 Bankr. 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 32 Bankr. 725
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). The court found that the thrust of the complaint addressed the debtor's
prepetition activities in causing the pollution and that § 959 applied only to postpetition
conduct. Id. In addition, the court asserted its discretionary power to refuse to allow the
entire suit even to the extent that the plaintiff alleged postpetition violations. Id. But see
Hoffman, Environmental Protection and Bankruptcy Rehabilitation: Toward a Better
Compromise, 11 EcoLoGY L.Q. 671, 696-97 (1984) (arguing that the Revere Copper court
applied § 959 improperly).
179. 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) (1982).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657 (1982).
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upon the parties responsible for creating the hazard.18 ' To accom-
plish these goals, CERCLA establishes the "superfund" to finance
appropriate remedial actions by the government'8 2 and identifies
several categories of "responsible parties" who must reimburse ei-
ther the fund or the government for the cost of necessary remedial
action.18 3 In addition, CERCLA specifically provides that the fed-
eral government may act to obtain whatever relief may be neces-
sary to abate a substantial and imminent hazard.8 4 CERCLA thus
uses economic interests both as an incentive, encouraging a state to
take remedial action and obtain reimbursement from responsible
parties, and as a deterrent, threatening responsible parties with
enormous financial liability if they do not use proper disposal tech-
niques or take appropriate remedial action. The interrelationship
of these CERCLA provisions shows that, in the area of hazardous
waste cleanup, Congress intended to subordinate the parties' eco-
nomic interests to the public interest in health and safety.
CERCLA established the superfund to provide partial reim-
bursement for appropriate remedial action taken by the govern-
ment to clean up hazardous waste sites. 8  Recourse to the
superfund to finance cleanup efforts is not automatic, but is sub-
ject to various limitations and restrictions. First, because the
amount of money in the fund is limited, the fund can finance
cleanup of only the sites on the EPA's national priority list. 8 6 Sec-
ond, the fund generally may be used only if no responsible parties
181. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43
(E.D. Pa. 1982); Abating an Imminent Hazard, supra note 164, at 796-97; see also HR.
1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6119-36
("The purpose of section [107] is to provide a mechanism for prompt recovery . . . from
persons responsible. . . ."); Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM J.
ENvTL. L. 1, 12 (1982).
182. CERCLA § 132, 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982) (establishing fund); CERCLA § 104, 42
U.S.C. § 9604 (1982) (President's authority to take remedial action); CERCLA § 111, 42
U.S.C. § 9611(a)(1) (1982) (fund used for government actions under CERCLA § 104).
183. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982).
184. CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1982); CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982).
The President may act, consistent with the National Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 300
(1984), whenever there is a release, or a substantial threat of release, of a hazardous sub-
stance, a pollutant, or a contaminant presenting an imminent and substantial danger to the
public health or welfare. CERCLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1982). Pollutants and con-
taminants include substances that may cause disease, death, behavioral abnormalities, can-
cer, genetic mutation, psychological malfunctions or physical deformities. CERCLA §
104(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(2) (1982).
185. CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(1) (1982).
186. See Abating an Imminent Hazard, supra note 164, at 803. See generally 40
C.F.R. § 300.66 (1984) (methods for establishing priorities for removal and remedial action).
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are able to take appropriate remedial action.l 7 Third, the EPA re-
quires state cooperation that is often difficult to obtain. 188 The
state must provide ten percent of the long-term remedial costs,
and, if the state ever owned the site, at least fifty percent of the
response cost.'89 In addition, the state must provide for proper dis-
posal and future maintenance. 90 Because so many states are una-
ble or unwilling to make these required contributions, access to the
superfund has been curtailed greatly.' 9 '
Last, remedial action that the fund financed must be "cost ef-
fective."'192 Although CERCLA does not define the term "cost ef-
fectiveness," 193 CERCLA requires balancing the need for cleanup
at a particular site against the money available in the fund.'9 4 In
addition, CERCLA implies a need to balance the cost of taking a
certain remedial action against the environmental and public wel-
fare benefit that the action will provide. 95 In either case, economic
187. See CERCLA § 104(a)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982); Abating an Imminent
Hazard, supra note 164, at 800-01.
188. Id.; see also Note, The Role of Injunctive Relief and Settlements in Superfund
Enforcement, 68 CoRNmzL L. REv. 706, 724 (1983).
189. CERCLA § 104(c)(3)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3)(C) (1982).
190. CERCLA § 104(c)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3)(A) (1982).
191. See EPA Guidance Memorandum on Establishing National Priorities Under
Superfund Law, ENv'T REP. (BNA) 339 (July 2, 1982); Abating an Imminent Hazard, supra
note 164, at 804.
192. CERCLA § 104(c)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(4) (1982); see also CERCLA § 101(24),
42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1982).
193. See generally Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Envi-
ronmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARv. ENvTL. L. Rav. 191 (1980) (identifying and discussing
four different cost/benefit analysis requirements under environmental regulations).
194. See CERCLA § 104(c)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(4) (1982) (The President shall se-
lect necessary and appropriate remedial actions that allow "for that cost-effective response
which provides a balance between the need for protection of public health and welfare and
the environment at the facility under consideration, and the availability of amounts from
the Fund ... to respond to other sites .. , taking into consideration the need for immedi-
ate action.").
195. See CERCLA § 101(24), 42 U.S.C § 9601(24) (1982). A "remedy" or "remedial
action" may call for permanent relocation of residences, businesses, or community facilities
when the action is more cost-effective than and environmentally preferable to other offsite
disposition. Also, CERCLA does not include offsite disposition of hazardous substances as a
"remedy" or "remedial action" unless it is more "cost-effective" than other methods, or
when the action is necessary to protect public health and welfare or the environment from a
present or potential risk. Id. Section 104 authorizes the President to take "remedial action"
consistent with the National Contingency Plan to handle the cleanup of hazardous sub-
stances. CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982).
The EPA defines a "cost-effective remedy" as "one which, among the alternatives ex-
amined, is least costly but technologically feasible, reliable, and adequately protects public
health and the environment." Cost-effectiveness thus depends upon the "probable cost and
technological feasibility of alternative remedial actions" as well as the "degree of risk" that
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considerations may limit the extent of the cleanup of a hazardous
site.
CERCLA's imminent endangerment provision, section 106(a),
however, does not specify that cost effectiveness is a consideration.
Rather, when an "actual or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance" poses "an imminent and substantial endangerment to the
public health or welfare or the environment,"19 the government
may act without regard to cost effectiveness.197 In addition, the
EPA considers cost effectiveness only for fund-financed cleanup
and not for relief sought through administrative or judicial proce-
dures under section 106(a). 198 Thus, in cases of imminent hazard,
the economic interests addressed in other parts of CERCLA give
way to its primary purpose of protecting the public from the dan-
gers of improper disposal of toxic and hazardous materials.
One of the main goals of CERCLA is to put the cost of clean-
ing up hazardous waste where the cost belongs-on the parties who
caused the problem.199 CERCLA and RCRA act together to inter-
nalize the social costs of hazardous waste generation and disposal
in considering the cost effectiveness and the perceived fairness of
imposing these costs on the parties conducting such ultrahazardous
activity.20 0 Consequently, CERCLA's section 107 imposes liability
the particular site presents. EPA Memorandum on Cost Recovery Actions Under the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Aug. 26, 1983), re-
printed in ENV'T REP. (BNA) Fed. Laws 41:2861; see 40 C.F.R. § 300.68 (1984) (National
Contingency Plan); see also Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984)
(stating that cost-effectiveness of remedial action is an issue in considering the particular
item of damages that a responsible party must pay).
196. See CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982).
197. CERCLA § 106(a) provides that the President may require the Attorney General
to secure "such relief as may be necessary" to abate an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to the public health or welfare or the environment. The appropriate district court may
then "grant such relief as the public interest and the equities of the case may require."
CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982). In addition, the President may take other
action, including issuing orders for violation of which a party may be fined up to $5000 a
day. CERCLA § 106(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (1982); see H.R. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 30
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6133 ("Emergency actions should
not be delayed by having to make a cost-balancing determination."). Courts construing the
scope of CERCLA § 106 also have relied on cases interpreting the similar endangerment
provision under RCRA § 7003. See, e.g., United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F.
Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982).
198. See EPA Guidelines for Using the Imminent Hazard, Enforcement and Emer-
gency Response Authorities of Superfund and Other Statutes (May 11, 1982), published at
47 Fed. Reg. 20664, reprinted in ENV'T REP. (BNA) Fed. Laws 21:4301. These guidelines,
published pursuant to CERCLA § 106(c), state that the "cost-balancing considerations are
applicable only to Fund-financed activities." 47 Fed. Reg. at 20666.
199. See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. 9607 (1982).
200. See Abating an Imminent Hazard, supra note 164, at 796-97. See generally
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on individuals who transport, store, or dispose of hazardous sub-
stances, along with operators and owners of hazardous sites.0 1 Sec-
tion 107 has a dual function. First, the provision allows for reim-
bursement to the superfund2 02 or to any other entity that finances
the cleanup of the hazardous waste site. Second, the provision reg-
ulates the future activities of individuals in the hazardous waste
business by threatening financial retribution.0 3
Most courts have construed sections 106 and 107 broadly,
holding that the parties liable under section 107 are also responsi-
ble under section 106.204 Courts have imposed both strict liability
and joint and several I/ability20 5 and have included even past off-
site generators within the pool of responsible parties.206 Further-
Grad, supra note 181.
201. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982).
202. The superfund is financed primarily by industry fees, rather than by general tax
revenue, to spread the cost more equitably among individuals who benefit from creating the
waste. See Grad, supra note 181, at 12.
203. See HR 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. N.ws 6136 ("The purpose of section 3071 [CERCLA § 107] is to provide a mechanism
for prompt recoveries of monies expended ... and to induce such potentially liable persons
to pursue appropriate environmental response actions voluntarily."); id. at 63 (Remarks of
Rep. Gore) ("[Tihe liability sections are also important in addressing the existing problem
and creating a strong incentive to ensure that a high standard of care is observed by future
generators, handlers and disposers of hazardous waste."). See generally Abating an Immi-
nent Hazard, supra note 164, at 795-98. This dual puipose is reflected in the EPA's policy
to pursue bankrupt responsible parties only if their assets are sufficient to provide reim-
bursement, or if action against them may deter other parties contemplating bankruptcy to
evade CERCLA or RCRA obligations. EPA Guidance for Bankruptcy, supra note 13, at 2-3;
cf. In re Cox, 33 Bankr. 657, 659-60 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983) (criminal prosecution costs
payable to government not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523, because purpose was not to
compensate government or create new source of revenue, but to "regulate behavior by threat
of financial retribution") (quoting 3 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcy 57.22 (14th ed. 1977)).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill.
1982). See generally Abating an Imminent Hazard, supra note 164, at 809-12. CERCLA §
106 does not list parties specifically subject to its reach, while § 107 identifies responsible
parties. CERLCA §§ 106, 107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607 (1982).
205. The final version of CERCLA eliminated specific provisions for strict liability as
well as joint and several liability, but courts generally have imposed such liability. See, e.g.,
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo.
1984) (strict and joint and several liability); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546
F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982) (strict liability); cf. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572
F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (holding development of federal common law necessary be-
cause of the complexity and magnitude of problems). But see United States v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54, 56 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (ruling out development of federal com-
mon law in view of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), which held that the CWA
preempted the federal common law of water pollution).
206. See, e.g., Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (past genera-
tors subject to both CERCLA and RCRA); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (past generators subject to CERCLA but not
19851 HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP 1071
more, most courts have read the "substantial and imminent endan-
germent" language of section 106 as a substantive rather than a
jurisdictional provision and have allowed action upon a mere
threat of endangerment.20 7 In addition, failure to provide proper
remedial action under section 106 may subject a party to crimi-
nal2°8 and ciil penalties, 0 9 as well as punitive damages.210
RCRA); see also United States v. Waste Indus., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984) (past genera-
tors subject to RCRA § 7003). But see United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (past generators not subject to either CERCLA or RCRA), appeal dismissed, 713 F.2d
49 (3d Cir. 1983).
207. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (evidence of imminent and substantial endangerment); United
States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. l. 1982) (same); United States v.
Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982) (imminent and substantial
endangerment sufficient to assert claim under CERCLA or RCRA); see also United States v.
Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984) (substantive content of emer-
gency provisions under RCRA, CWA, and SDWA, but no private cause of action).
The 1984 RCRA amendments further expand the EPA's enforcement capabilities by
adding a provision authorizing the EPA to compel facilities with "interim status" to take
"corrective action" upon the release of a hazardous substance. RCRA § 3008(h), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(h) (Supp. 1985). These new powers are similar to the provisions of CERCLA § 106,
but even broader because the new powers do not contain "imminent and substantial dan-
ger" language. Unlike RCRA's imminent hazard provision, see RCRA § 7003, 42 U.S.C. §
6973 (1982), the new § 3008(h) is not restricted to the enforcement of RCRA regulatory
requirements, nor is the new section confined to areas within the facility's boundaries. Thus,
these amendments possibly could compel a wider array of remedial actions. Lucero Says
1984 RCRA Amendments Give EPA Broader Power to Require Facility Cleanups, [Current
Developments] 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 33, at 1374 (Dec. 14, 1984).
208. For example, when a person in charge of a facility fails to notify the authorities of
a release of hazardous substances, CERCLA § 103(b) imposes a fine of up to $10,000 or a
prison term of not more than a year. CERCLA § 103(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1982). Im-
proper handling of hazardous waste also invokes criminal penalties of up to $50,000 per day
under RCRA § 3008(d). RCRA § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1982). RCRA imposes further
criminal penalties of up to $250,000 a day for an individual and up to $1,000,000 a day for
an organization that "knowingly endangers" human life by violating RCRA provisions.
RCRA § 3008(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9692(e) (1982). The EPA recently has conducted criminal in-
vestigations into alleged extensive dumping of PCBs into open lagoons and has filed suit to
impose civil penalties of $6.8 million. See U.S. Charges Waste Management, Inc. Dumped
PCB's, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1985, at 8, col. 4.
209. Under CERCLA § 106(b), a party that willfully fails to comply with an adminis-
trative order under § 106(a) is subject to fines of up to $5000 for each day of violation.
CERCLA § 106(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (1982). CERCLA § 109 imposes a civil penalty of up
to $10,000 per day of violation for failure to comply with the financial responsibility require-
ments of § 108. CERCLA § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 9609 (1982). RCRA § 3008(a) provides civil
penalties for failure to take required corrective action under an administrative order or in-
junction. RCRA § 3008(a), 42 U.S.C. 6928(a) (1982); see also Waste Management Agrees to
Pay Penalty, Dispose of PCBs Stored at Emelle, Ala. Site, [Current Developments] 15
ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 35, at 1431 (Dec. 28, 1984) (operator/owner of largest U.S. facility
agreed to pay a $600,000 civil penalty and dispose of 2.8 million gallons of PCBs).
210. A party that fails to respond as ordered under § 104 or § 106 must pay punitive
damages of up to three times the amount of costs that the superfund incurred. Any money
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
CERCLA thus subordinates the economic interests of the re-
sponsible parties to the public health and safety interest in abating
imminent danger from hazardous waste sites. The CERCLA ap-
proach is consistent with the Bankruptcy Code's subordination of
economic interests in situations concerning government actions
and regulations protecting the public health and safety. Similarly,
in resolving conflicts between the Bankruptcy Code and hazardous
waste laws, a bankruptcy court should give more weight to hard-
ships that are partly health and safety related than to hardships
that are solely economic. When a court assesses the qualitative de-
gree of hardship that a party would face if its interests were subor-
dinated by the Code, the fundamental question should be whether
the party's interests are purely economic or are also health related.
The government's interest in cases concerning the cleanup of
hazardous waste sites almost always will be both economic and
public health and safety related because the debtor's failure to
clean up the site will expose the public to hazardous substances
and leave the government to bear the cost. In Kovacs 11 the Su-
preme Court recognized that Ohio's interest was primarily eco-
nomic because of the financial approach Ohio had taken to imple-
ment the cleanup. The Court, however, expressly noted that its
decision did not cover situations in which a government uses crimi-
nal sanctions to compel a debtor to clean up a dumpsite.21' In
those cases, the government would have more interest in public
health and safety than in economic concerns. Accordingly, a court
should weigh the government's interests more heavily.
In Johns-Manville the court noted that the government could
provide funds for the cleanup and then file a claim for reimburse-
ment either against the debtor or against superfunds under state
or federal law. 12 This approach, however, has several drawbacks.
First, superfund limitations and restrictions might prevent a gov-
ernment from using those funds, even if the fund contained a suffi-
received as punitive damages is deposited in the superfund. CERCLA § 107(c), 42 US.C.
9607(c) (1982).
211. Ohio v. Kovacs, 53 U.S.L.W. 4068, 4071 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1985); see also supra notes
83-103, and accompanying text (describing Kovacs' narrow holding); supra note 208 and
accompanying text (describing criminal sanctions).
212. United States v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 13 ENvTL. L. RFP. (ENVrL. L. INST.)
20310, 20310-12 (D.N.H. 1982) (suggesting reimbursement actions under CERCLA §§ 104
and 107 and under New Hampshire's Hazardous Waste Cleanup Fund, RSA 147-B (Supp.
1981), and pointing out that the city in City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F.
Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982) followed this procedure).
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cient amount to finance the cleanup.21 3 Second, a government tak-
ing this approach against a debtor would be left with only a
"pecuniary loss," a "money judgment," or an "alternative right to
payment. 2 14 Consequently, government actions against the debtor
for reimbursement probably would fall outside the scope of the
section 362(b)(4) and (b)(5) provisions, and the government's claim
would be dischargeable because the government's interest at that
point would be solely pecuniary. 15 This result would give the gov-
ernment an economic incentive to refrain from financing any
cleanup efforts to avoid being left with only a general unsecured
claim against the debtor's estate. Third, this approach may contra-
vene CERCLA's intent to provide a deterrent that induces entities
involved in the generation and disposal of hazardous waste to con-
duct their activities properly.
216
Last, the problem with either the reimbursement or the crimi-
nal sanctions approach is that the government may not act quickly
to abate the danger to the public health and safety. Both ap-
proaches encourage the government to pursue all available meth-
ods of extracting payment and cooperation from the responsible
party before spending any government money to clean up the site,
thus lessening the impact if the responsible party later files for
bankruptcy. This kind of incentive directly conflicts with CER-
CLA's goal of facilitating cleanup by encouraging states to act first
and obtain reimbursement later.
17
Generally, the interests of creditors and debtors in these cases
are solely economic in nature. The major problem with subordinat-
ing the economic interests of creditors and debtors to public health
and safety interests is that creditors would have no incentive to
make loans to companies that engage in hazardous waste disposal.
Because credit would be more difficult to obtain, the costs of haz-
ardous waste disposal would increase. In Quanta Resources, for ex-
ample, the dissent was concerned that innocent creditors ulti-
213. United States v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 13 ENvrL. L. REP. (ENvrrL. L. INST.)
20310, 20310 n.7 (D.N.H. 1982) (noting the potential lack of adequate funds). For a further
discussion of superfund limitations, see supra notes 185-95 and accompanying text.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 27-39 and 89-91.
215. See generally supra notes 22-82 (discussing cases deciding applicability of auto-
matic stay to government actions); supra notes 83-103 and accompanying text (discussing
dischargeability).
216. See H.R. 1016, pt. I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6120.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 183-84.
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mately would bear the cleanup costs.2 18 The majority, on the other
hand, was concerned that the debtor could foist the cleanup costs
upon the government after causing the problem by failing to com-
ply with the law in the first place.219 CERCLA's aim, however, is to
impose those costs upon the responsible parties, both as a matter
of economics and as a matter of deterrence. One of the goals of
CERCLA, in fact, is to achieve this kind of internalization of social
costs, forcing the price of goods connected with hazardous waste to
reflect the inevitable cleanup costs.220
B. Quantitative Differences
After examining qualitative considerations, courts applying
the balancing test should address the quantitative degree of hard-
ship that each party would suffer if its interests were subordinated.
The determination of the degree of hardship that the government
suffers should focus on both the magnitude of the risk that the
dump site presents to the public and the magnitude of the govern-
ment's economic loss. In calculating the magnitude of the risk to
the public health and safety, courts should assess such factors as
the form, amount, and toxicity of substances present, the popula-
tion at risk, the potential for contaminating the drinking water
supply, the danger of fire or explosion, and the danger of human,
animal, or food chain exposure to highly toxic substances.22' Under
section 106, CERCLA dictates a low threshold for imminent haz-
ard cases in which parties may obtain injunctions or other emer-
gency relief.222 Courts have interpreted this language broadly to
apply to situations in which a threatened release of hazardous sub-
stances is present, even if the harmful effect on public health
would not occur immediately.2 3 Courts should give considerable
218. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 926 (3d Cir. 1984) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
219. Id. at 921.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 199-200.
221. See 40 CFR § 300.65(a) (1984) (factors used to determine appropriateness of im-
mediate removal action); id. § 300.68(e)(2) (factors used to determine extent of danger in
cases of source control remedial actions); id. § 300, app. A (factors used to rate sites on
national priority list).
222. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982).
223. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co. 579 F.
Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (allegations of presence of substances with high toxicity at low
dosages sufficient); United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(allegations of release of PCBs sufficient, even without evidence of specific effects); United
States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982) (allegations of carci-
nogenic and toxic wastes leaking into ground over 55 years contaminating ground water to
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weight in a bankruptcy decision to any degree of risk that would
qualify for section 106 treatment. The quantitative degree of the
government's economic interest depends upon the cost of cleanup
and the available sources of revenue to cover the cleanup costs. If
the government can reach other responsible parties, or if
superfund money is available under state or federal law, the site
will be cleaned up and protecting the debtor will impose less hard-
ship on the public. If the debtor, on the other hand, is the only
responsible party, and no superfund money is available, protecting
the debtor will create a greater degree of economic hardship for the
public because other public funds will have to be used.
In Johns-Manville, for example, the governments' failure to
pursue other responsible parties, including the current owners of
the sites, particularly influenced the court's decision. The court
recognized that sufficient funds might not be available to the gov-
ernments. The court, nonetheless, frowned upon the fact that the
governments sought only nominal relief from site owners, while fo-
cusing all enforcement efforts on the debtor.22 ' In sum, the govern-
ments would suffer a lower quantitative degree of economic hard-
ship upon dismissal of the enforcement action against the debtor
because other possible sources of funds were available.
The quantitative degree of economic loss that the debtor or
the creditors would suffer depends upon the assets of the debtor's
estate and the types of creditor claims. If substantial assets remain
in the estate, the other creditors will suffer equally substantial loss
if most of the assets are used to finance the cleanup. If the estate
has no remaining assets, the government is unlikely to bring suit.
In general, the EPA pursues bankrupt responsible parties only if
the estate has sufficient assets and only if there are few secured
creditors with limited claims.225
Secured creditors 225 whose claims are subordinated will suffer
extent that migration would continue without preventive action).
224. United States v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 13 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENvT. L. INST.)
20310, 20311 (D.N.H. 1982). The individual site owners were asked only to note on their
deeds the presence of hazardous waste and to permit inspection. Id. at 20311 n.11.
225. EPA Guidance for Bankruptcy, supra note 13, at 2-3; see also supra text accom-
panying notes 199-203 (discussing EPA's goal of deterrence).
226. A secured creditor's claim may be protected by the fifth amendment takings
clause, but this issue is not yet clear. Although a secured creditor's rights in a debtor's
property generally constitute "property" subject to "taking" under the fifth amendment, see
United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982), a court may instead classify a
state's enforcement of an environmental regulation as "a permissible exercise of the state's
regulatory power to promote the public good... ."In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d
912, 922 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing cases on this issue); see also Michelman, Property, Utility
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a greater degree of economic loss than general unsecured creditors
because general unsecured creditors, even under normal condi-
tions, usually recover little from a debtor's estate.227 The secured
creditors' economic loss is especially significant when the creditors
have claims against unclouded assets of the estate. In cases in
which the secured property is the hazardous waste site, however,
the degree of the secured creditor's loss might be less significant.
In In Re Berg Chemical Co. the court noted that the need to un-
dertake expensive cleanup efforts substantially decreases the resale
value of property.228 Thus, the secured creditor recovering the
property is left with an asset already subject to huge liabilities, in-
stead of an asset worth enough to allow the creditor to recoup its
investment. Courts, therefore, should consider less heavily the eco-
nomic hardship to the creditor in having its interests subordinated.
C. Good Faith
The third part of the balancing formula requires the court to
examine the motives of the parties concerned with the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. Although the Bankruptcy Code does not ex-
pressly require good faith in filing a petition, courts traditionally
have interpreted the Code as retaining the bankruptcy courts'
broad equitable powers to dismiss a petition filed in bad faith.229
The question of bad faith has focused on the debtor's attempt to
use the bankruptcy system for some purpose other than for what
Congress intended. 30 Labeling a particular petition as filed in bad
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1183-84 (1967) (discussing factors relevant to characterizing action as
either regulation or taking). A full discussion of the scope and clarity of this distinction is
beyond the scope of this Note.
227. See supra note 135.
228. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., In re Kahn, 34 Bankr. 574 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (good faith required
under Chapter 11 and Chapter 13); see also Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating
Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1123 (1983). See gen-
erally Gaffney, Bankruptcy Petitions Filed in Bad Faith: What Actions Can Creditors'
Counsel Take?, 12 U.C.C. L.J. 205 (1979). Dismissal "for cause" is allowed under 11 U.S.C. §§
707, 1112(b), or 1307(c). The courts require good faith for confirmation of a Chapter 11 or
Chapter 13 reorganization plan. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(3), 1322(b)(7) (1982). Generally, the
courts use the same kind of analysis in determining "good faith" in the filing of the original
petition. In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 Bankr. 549, 551 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 37
Bankr. 222 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984) (providing extensive history of development of good faith
doctrine).
230. See Gaffney, supra note 229, at 225; Note, supra note 229, at 1123. See generally
In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 37 Bankr. 222
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984) (history of development of good faith doctrine).
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faith, however, is difficult because the Bankruptcy Code serves
many purposes and protects a wide variety of interests.2"' Legiti-
mate bankruptcy purposes include ensuring a "fresh start" for the
individual debtor,23 2 providing equitable treatment for creditors,233
and safeguarding existing jobs for employees.
23 4
The Bankruptcy Code provides the honest debtor with a fresh
start and relief from harassing creditors, but does not operate au-
tomatically to relieve debtors from the "unpleasant effects" of
valid local laws.235 For example, the automatic stay provision does
not apply to criminal actions against the debtor.3 6 Courts may re-
fuse to discharge some criminal restitution orders.3 7 Statutory ex-
emptions from discharge include penalties payable to the govern-
ment28 8 and claims based on the debtor's willful and malicious
injury of property.3 9 In these areas the debtor's own actions
weaken the interest in a fresh start.
231. See, e.g., Rogers, In re Johns-Manville Corp.: The Delicate Balance of Fairness
Between Bankruptcy and Products Liability Law, 3 JL. & Com. 365, 378 (1983) ("The task
of defining good faith... is difficult in the commercial context. In the bankruptcy context,
it may well be impossible.").
232. See, e.g., In re C. & W. Mining Co., 38 Bankr. 496, 503 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)
(The bankruptcy court "provides a safe haven and a fresh start for the honest debtor."); In
re Wheeler, 38 Bankr. 842, 845 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984) ("One of the primary goals of the
Bankruptcy [Code] is to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebted-
ness and permit him to start afresh, free from the obligations and responsibilities conse-
quent upon business misfortunes."). See generally Gaffney, supra note 229, at 225; Rogers,
supra note 231. Providing a "fresh start" for corporate or partnership debtors in Chapter 7
liquidations, however, may no longer be a major goal of the Bankruptcy Code because the
1978 Bankruptcy Code does not allow discharge for debts of nonindividuals. 11 U.S.C. §
727(a)(1) (1982); see In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 915 n.7 (3d Cir. 1984)
(citing S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Seass. 98 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5884).
233. E.g., In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1984).
234. See Gaffney, supra note 229, at 225; Note, supra note 229, at 1126.
235. In re Kennise Diversified Corp., 34 Bankr. 237, 245 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); Don-
ovan v. TMC Indus., Ltd., 20 Bankr. 997, 1001 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982) (the government's
interest in enforcing federal labor law outweighed debtor's interest in "disentangling himself
from sundry creditors"); see also In re Canarico Quarries, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1333 (D.P.R.
1979) (although one of main goals of prior Bankruptcy Act was rehabilitation of debtor,
rehabilitation must occur within the law, and debtor company must comply with require-
ments of Clean Air Act).
236. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (1982).
237. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text. In Kovacs II Ohio argued that
the order, although entered as a civil remedy, was based on Kovacs' statutory violations and
thus should be nondischargeable. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. Ohio v. Ko-
vacs, 53 U.S.L.W. 4068, 4069 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1985). The Court, however, expressly disclaimed
that its decision would affect Ohio's criminal remedies against Kovacs or other polluters. Id.
238. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1982).
239. Id. § 523(a)(6).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Beyond the debtor's motive in filing for bankruptcy, the
court's determination of good faith should include whether the
debtor has adhered to legal duties. For example, in balancing the
equities under the Bildisco test for rejecting union contracts, some
courts identify as a factor the debtor's bad faith in refusing to co-
operate with union members in attempting to work out a compro-
mise arrangement.2 40 On the other hand, efforts by the employer
and employees to negotiate an agreement may amount to good
faith.241 These courts view good faith as a factor in the Bildisco
test, focusing on not only the debtor's motives in filing for bank-
ruptcy, but also the debtor's bad faith violation of the labor laws.
Similarly, courts should view a debtor filing for bankruptcy
solely to evade obligations to dispose of hazardous waste as acting
in bad faith. The debtor's conduct immediately prior to filing the
petition and during the proceedings also may amount to bad faith
if the debtor knowingly allows further release of hazardous
substances.242
In In re Charles George Land Reclamation Trust,243 for exam-
ple, the court stressed that the debtor had released a huge amount
of highly toxic waste at the beginning of the Chapter 11 proceed-
ings. In contrast, in the two Kovacs decisions, neither the Sixth
Circuit nor the Supreme Court emphasized Kovacs' continued op-
eration of his business in flagrant disregard of the cleanup order
that the court entered with his consent after three years of negoti-
ation. 44 These types of activites should be classified as bad faith
240. See, e.g., In re C. & W. Mining Co., 38 Bankr. 496, 500 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)
(debtor must prove it is not "improperly motivated" by desire to rid itself of union); In re
Pesce Baking Co., 43 Bankr. 949 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (debtor's president hired nonun-
ion family members and refused to negotiate with union employees who had worked at low
wages to retain health and pension benefits).
241. See, e.g., In re Briggs Transp. Co., 39 Bankr. 343 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (rejec-
tion of contract allowed, especially in light of extensive efforts by debtor company and em-
ployees to relieve problems in other ways).
242. This approach is in keeping with CERCLA § 107(c)(2), which provides an excep-
tion from the ordinary liability limitations when "willful misconduct or willful and knowing
negligence causes the release of hazardous waste substances, or when the responsible party
fails or refuses to cooperate fully with the proper officials. CERCLA § 107(c)(2), 42 U.S.C.
9607(c)(2) (1982); see also Rosenbaum, supra note 11, at 10103 n.56 (arguing that an inten-
tional environmental violation in contemplation of bankruptcy is "roughly analogous" to a
preference, see 11 U.S.C. § 547, because the illegal dumping would protect economic credi-
tors at public expense).
243. 30 Bankr. 918 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983); see supra notes 126-33 and accompanying
text (discussing Charles George).




on the debtor's part, and consequently, the court should give less
weight to the debtor's interests. If the debtor, on the other hand,
has been acting in good faith by making initial efforts to comply
with the laws, by cooperating with enforcement authorities in ne-
gotiating a compromise, and by attempting to comply with the
terms of that agreement, then the court should give more weight to
the debtor's interest.
The major problem with conditioning bankruptcy protection
partially upon the debtor's good faith is that this approach essen-
tially saddles creditors with a duty to monitor their debtor's con-
duct to protect their investments. The costs of monitoring could
discourage creditors from making loans to companies connected
with hazardous waste. Again, federal hazardous waste regulation
contemplates this kind of internalization of social costs.245 Impos-
ing such a monitoring duty on creditors is not completely unac-
ceptable; a creditor who knowingly loans money to a debtor that
engages in improper and illegal hazardous waste disposal does not
deserve the full protection of the Bankruptcy Code. The loan
might be favorable to the economic interests of the debtor and the
creditor, but might completely ignore the danger to the public
health and safety. Under CERCLA, present owners of dump sites
may be liable for cleanup costs even when the activities of the past
owner actually caused the danger.2 " Creditors making loans in
"studied indifference"' 47 to companies involved with hazardous
waste should occupy an equivalent position.
Courts also should examine the motives and conduct of the
government. Pursuing the bankrupt while failing to involve other
responsible parties or use other available funds may amount to bad
faith by the government. In United States v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp.,4 s for example, the court emphasized both the govern-
ments' failure to bring substantial claims against other responsible
parties and the governments' failure to use either superfund
money or their own funds to effect the cleanup. 49 In other cases,
the state may own, or may have owned, a hazardous waste site,
245. See supra text accompanying notes 199-201.
246. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982).
247. In United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d
Cir. 1982), the court held that the present owners of dump sites were contributing to the
release of hazardous substances by refusing to act and by maintaining a "studied indiffer-
ence" to the presence of hazardous wastes. Id. at 1073.
248. 13 ENvrL. L. RFp. (ENvL. L. INsT.) 20310 (D.N.H. 1982); see supra notes 57-70
and accompanying text (discussing Johns-Manville).
249. 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (E!-rL. L. INST.) at 20310-11.
19851 1079
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
thus qualifying as a responsible party under CERCLA.25 ° In these
circumstances, the amount of the financial contribution required
from the state depends in part upon its "degree of responsibil-
ity."'251 A state then may attempt to avoid its responsibility by pur-
suing all other responsible parties instead of cleaning up the site
on its own. Because CERCLA requires state cooperation for access
to federal superfund money,252 courts should view a state's refusal
to cooperate as bad faith.
The government's characterization of its actions as solely an
exercise of police and regulatory power to protect the public health
and safety, when the government's interests are in fact solely eco-
nomic, is another form of bad faith. Courts should not allow a gov-
ernment to elevate economic concerns above the responsibility to
protect the public health and safety. When the government makes
this inappropriate decision, courts should weigh the government's
interests less heavily. If, however, the government accepts its re-
sponsibilities, takes appropriate remedial action, and pursues the
debtor in an effort to force compliance with the law and to deter
future violations, then the courts should weigh the government's
interests more seriously.
In Kovacs 11253 the Supreme Court characterized Ohio's inter-
ests as solely economic. Ohio had argued that its interests were ex-
clusively public health and safety related, in an effort to avoid the
restrictions of the Bankruptcy Code. Ohio's overall conduct did not
constitute bad faith, however, because the state took proper reme-
dial action to clean up the site and pursued other responsible par-
ties for reimbursement. Furthermore, any bad faith by the state in
characterizing its interests was less serious than Kovacs' bad faith
in acting in flagrant disregard of the cleanup order to which he had
consented. The state action was a good faith effort both to enforce
compliance and to deter future violations of hazardous waste laws.
The Court, therefore, should have given the state's interest more
consideration. 4
250. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (transporters of waste bribed city employees to allow illegal dumping on a city owned
site).
251. CERCLA § 104(c)(3)(C)(ii), 42 U.S.C. 9604(c)(3)(C)(ii) (1982).
252. CERCLA § 104(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. 9604(c)(3) (1982); see supra text accompanying
notes 188-91.
253. Ohio v. Kovacs, 53 U.S.L.W. 4068 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1985); see supra notes 40-56 and
83-103 and accompanying text.
254. In view of the Kovacs H decision, a state still may be able to ensure that its
efforts are seen as noneconomic by pursuing the debtor with criminal sanctions rather than
1080 [Vol. 38:1037
HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP
Courts should not allow the state to avoid its obligation to
protect the public health and safety by insisting that the obligation
only applies to the debtor. Courts also should not allow the debtor
to avoid responsibility for dangerous conditions resulting from con-
duct that state and federal laws prohibit. Courts should recognize
that the need to protect the community from the threat of hazard-
ous waste takes priority over the economic interests of the parties,
the government, the debtors, and other creditors.
D. Application
Courts applying this balancing approach should place each
factor on a continuum that ranges from a strictly economic context
to a strictly public health and safety context. At the economic end
of the continuum, the Bankruptcy Code should prevail. At the
other extreme, courts should subordinate bankruptcy goals to the
federal goal of protecting public health and safety. Johns-
Manville255 serves as an example at the economic end of the spec-
trum. As in most hazardous waste cases, the government had both
economic and public health and safety interests. The government's
public health and safety interest, however, was less compelling in
this case because the creditors also had health-related interests.
Because of the great number of creditors with large claims, the
quantitative degree of hardship to the creditors was great. The
court, by allowing the state to compel cleanup, would have di-
verted substantial assets in the estate from claims of the creditors.
The quantitative degree of economic harm to the government and
the public, however, was not as great because the government
could have pursued the present owners or other responsible parties
to pay for the cleanup. Furthermore, the state might have had ac-
cess to superfund money to help finance the cleanup.
In examining the relative good faith of the debtor and the gov-
ernment in Johns-Manville, the court should have found that the
government's failure to take any cleanup steps, expend any of its
own funds, or pursue any other responsible party constituted bad
faith. The debtor, on the other hand, had not acted in bad faith in
relation to the government's cleanup efforts.256 On balance, then,
through receiverships or other state equivalents of bankruptcy. See Kovacs II, 53 U.S.L.W.
4068.
255. United States v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 13 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.)
20310 (D.N.H. Nov. 15, 1982); see supra text accompanying notes 57-70 (discussing Johns-
Manville).
256. Admittedly, Johns-Manville's motive in filing the bankruptcy petition may have
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the court should have defined the government's action against
Johns-Manville as economic and should have treated it as an ordi-
nary bankruptcy claim. Indeed, the Johns-Manville court actually
considered these same factors, although in an unarticulated man-
ner, and appropriately found that the automatic stay prohibited
the government's action against the debtor.
Charles George2 57 serves as an example at the public health
and safety end of the spectrum. Again, the government had both
economic and public health and safety interests. Unlike Johns-
Manville, however, no other creditors in Charles George had coun-
tervailing health-related interests. The government in Charles
George clearly focused more on public health and safety concerns
than on economic considerations. Before the bankruptcy, the city
had issued numerous health orders, the state had negotiated a con-
sent order that defined the debtor's responsibilities, and a state
court judge was actively supervising the debtor's activities. The po-
tential quantitative degree of harm to the public was tremendous
because the site presented an imminent danger. The debtor's site
already had contaminated neighboring wells, and the debtor subse-
quently released an additional 10,000 gallons of hazardous material
that further threatened the public drinking water supply. The
quantitative economic hardship to other creditors, however, would
have been minimal because the government's claims were so sub-
stantial that the prospects of a dividend to the other creditors
would have been "negligible.
' '258
In determining the relative good faith of the government and
the debtor, the Charles George court should have concluded that
the debtor's illegal contamination of the public water source con-
stituted bad faith. The debtor's conduct flagrantly violated the
agreement negotiated with the state as well as state and federal
law. Furthermore, the debtor's motive in converting his Chapter 11
reorganization petition to a Chapter 7 liquidation may have been
to avoid the less stringent dismissal requirements of Chapter 11.259
This motive would have constituted bad faith. The government, on
the other hand, acted in good faith by attempting to enforce com-
pliance with the cleanup order prior to bankruptcy and by at-
been the desire to avoid products liability claims, but this motive is unrelated to the hazard-
ous waste cleanup issue.
257. In re Charles George Land Reclamation Trust, 30 Bankr. 918 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1983); see supra text accompanying notes 126-33 (discussing Charles George).
258. Charles George, 30 Bankr. at 924 n.9.
259. Id. at 920 n.2 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (1982)).
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tempting to address the emergency that arose after bankruptcy.
On balance, the Charles George court appropriately dismissed the
debtor's petition and allowed the state to abate the public health
hazard.
The two Kovacs cases260 occupy different positions along the
spectrum between these two extremes. In both Kovacs cases, pub-
lic health and safety concerns initially prompted the action by the
state. The state, however, manifested an economic concern by ap-
pointing a receiver rather than expending the state's own funds.
The Supreme Court, therefore, may have appropriately character-
ized the interest of the state as economic.
The potential quantitative degree of hardship to the govern-
ment and the public changed during the interval between the two
cases. The potential harm was greater in Kovacs I because cleanup
had just begun. By the time of Kovacs II, however, cleanup was
substantially complete, thus lowering the potential harm to the
public. The quantitative degree of hardship to the individual
debtor and the other creditors was substantially different in the
two cases. In Kovacs I the court would have decreased or elimi-
nated the assets available for other creditor claims if it allowed an
action to enforce the debtor's prepetition cleanup obligation. This
action, however, would not have had a negative impact on the
debtor because the action would have affected only the bankruptcy
estate. In Kovacs II the equities were reversed. Refusing to dis-
charge the debtor from prepetition obligations would not have had
an effect on prepetition creditors because they already would have
received everything that they were entitled to receive from the
bankruptcy estate. The debtor, however, would have been subject
to continuing liability and denied the "fresh start" mandated by
bankruptcy policy.
The "fresh start" policy, however, is less compelling when the
debtor has acted in bad faith, as Kovacs did by continuing to oper-
ate his business in flagrant violation of the state court consent or-
der. The relative good faith of the state is difficult to determine.
Actions manifesting good faith include negotiating an agreed order
with the debtor, pursuing other responsible parties, and cooperat-
ing with the EPA to get superfund financing. Mitigating factors
that may cast some doubt on the good faith of the state include
260. In re Kovacs (Kovacs 1), 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded,
459 U.S. 1167 (1983); see supra text accompanying notes 40-56 and 83-103; Ohio v. Kovacs
(Kovacs I1), 53 U.S.L.W. 4068 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1985).
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failing to bring criminal charges or contempt proceedings against
the debtor, neglecting other Bankruptcy Code provisions that al-
low exceptions from discharge, and attempting to characterize the
economic interest of the state as purely public health and safety
related.
On balance, the debtor's bad faith should have weighed more
heavily against him in the dischargeability issue, especially because
the creditors would have suffered no hardship in bankruptcy.
Thus, the courts should have defined Kovacs' obligation as an eq-
uitable right to performance and refused to discharge that obliga-
tion. In Kovacs I the debtor's bad faith, however, was balanced to
some degree by the state's primarily economic approach to the case
and the other creditors' economic interests. Because the state
chose an economic approach, the court should have treated the
state's claims like other bankruptcy claims and applied the auto-
matic stay. If the state had expended its own funds for cleanup,
however, and later sued the debtor for reimbursement, then the
court should have characterized the state's action as a police or
regulatory action rather than an economic action. This characteri-
zation would further CERCLA's goal of encouraging the states to
take prompt cleanup measures.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts have addressed the recent conflict between the Bank-
ruptcy Code and state or federal hazardous waste laws by balanc-
ing the economic interests under the Bankruptcy Code against the
interests in public health and safety under the hazardous waste
laws. Courts have performed this balancing approach sometimes in
a conclusory manner and at other times in a more in-depth man-
ner. Because economic and public health and safety interests inevi-
tably overlap and conflict in these cases, courts should develop a
balancing test that identifies the nature of the interests. Courts
could model this balancing test after the Supreme Court's decision
in Bildisco, which resolved a similar conflict between the Bank-
ruptcy Code and federal labor laws. The balancing test would focus
on the hardships that the affected parties-the debtor, the credi-
tors, and the government-would suffer if their interests were sub-
ordinated to other interests. The test would require the courts to
consider the qualitative differences between economic and public
health and safety interests, the quantitative degree of hardship,
and the good or bad faith of the parties.
Federal policy under the federal hazardous waste laws and the
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Bankruptcy Code substantially subordinates economic interests to
public health and safety interests. A balancing test, therefore, also
should give extra weight to the interest in protecting the public
health and safety from hazardous wastes. The internalization of so-
cial costs under the federal hazardous waste laws may require the
subordination of creditors' claims, which are mainly economic in
nature, to the public interest in health and safety. The interests of
a debtor acting in bad faith, either in violating the hazardous waste
laws or in filing a bankruptcy petition, and the interests of a gov-
ernment attempting to avoid its cleanup responsibilities, do not
deserve much consideration. Courts should adopt this balancing
approach to prevent the operation of the Bankruptcy Code from
frustrating the goals of the federal hazardous waste laws.
Katherine Simpson Allen

